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This study is an investigation of some of the developmental challenges fac-
ing transition economies. The thesis provides empirical and theoretical analyses on
some of the institutional and macroeconomic challenges experienced by transition
economies along their developmental trajectory.
The thesis begins with an analysis of the reallocation of resources. Chapter 2
presents a model in which two groups in society are engaged in strategic interaction.
Privileged members of society have the opportunity to allocate resources either to their
own productive capacity, or to enhance the productive capacity of the disadvantaged.
Redistribution to the disadvantaged can increase the productive capacity of society,
but comes at the cost of rising political aspirations of the poor, which erodes the power
of the rich. The results of the model derive possible political outcomes for society
under which the rich will redistribute to the point of equality with the poor; conditions
under which the disadvantaged face genocide; as well as the range of intermediate
redistributive activity likely to be employed by the privileged.
Transition economies also face limited infrastructure development. This is espe-
cially true for countries in post-conict situations. Increasing levels of infrastructure
expenditure is argued to have a positive effect on growth. Chapter 3 analyses the
impact of economic and social infrastructure on economic growth for a specic tran-
sition economy - South Africa. South Africa experienced a declining trend in physical










while economic infrastructure has a positive effect on output, social infrastructure has
no effect. Crowding out effects arising from both economic and social infrastructure
expenditure are also discovered. The data also reveals that both output and private
investment have a positive effect on economic and social infrastructure expenditure.
The short term uctuations in output, employment and labour productivity in
South Africa are also investigated. The empirical evidence of negative correlation
between employment and labour productivity contradicts the hypothesis of standard
real business cycle theory. A model with monopolistic competition, sticky prices, and
variable effort is shown to be able to account for the empirical ndings. The nd-
ings indicate that technology shocks generate a negative comovement between labour
productivity and employment in South Africa. In addition, the degree of monetary
accommodation, returns to labour and the degree of price stickiness and imperfect
competition affects economic uctuations in employment and labour productivity due
to technology and demand shocks. Moreover, they affect the response of prices, real
money balances and real interest rates to a technology shock.
Evidence illustrating the relatively high volatility of real exchange rates in tran-
sition economies vis-à-vis developed economies in the recent past is the motivation
for our study in Chapter 5. The Chapter considers the cross-country determinants of
exchange rate volatility for a set of transition economies. The analysis focuses on the
macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy and external factors to determine if they










Overall, the investigation nds that higher levels of reserves reduce volatility, and it is
estimated that an appropriate level of reserves is approximately 4 1
2
months of imports.
Volatility is increased by increased uncertainty and loose scal policy. In addition, a
volatile terms of trade spills over into a volatile currency. From a policy perspective,
whilst it is clear that prudent macroeconomic policy is the best course of action to re-
duce exchange rate volatility, the inuence of external volatility on the exchange rate
(over which the authorities have no control) should not be underestimated.
In general, the study investigates four macroeconomic and institutional chal-
lenges faced by transition economies. The study allows for the possibility of divergent
economic and political outcomes to emerge mong transition economies due to dif-
ferences demography, resource allocation among groups in the society, infrastructure
development, in the competitive structure of the economy, scal and monetary policy.
These differences have a consequence on both the developmental outcomes in the long
run and short run uctuations in economic growth for these economies. Moreover,
the importance of good governance in the form of prudent macroeconomic policy and











Thanks go to my supervisors - Professor Johannes Fedderke and Professor Nicola
Viegi - for getting me thinking about some of the issues tackled in this thesis. Their ad-
vice, constructive comments, guidance and suggestions has been invaluable. Further,
the following individuals have provided useful suggestions on the chapters presented
in this thesis.
Chapter 2 - Many thanks to Philippe Aghion, Robert Bates, eljko Bogetić, Paul
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The characteristics that dene an economy as a transition economy1 are nu-
merous. In general, a transition economy is considered to be in a transitional phase
between developing and developed status. These economies are characterized by the
changing and creating of institutions and fundamental changes in the role of the state.
According to Havrylyshn and Wolf (1999), transition economies, in a broad sense,
implement market reforms along with the reallocation of resources to their most ef-
cient use, engage in macroeconomic stabilization policies, scal prudence, enforce
rule of law and property rights.
According to the denition above, a number of economies may be labelled
as transition economies. The origin of their developmental trajectory could be a
transformation from a socialist, command economy towards a market-oriented econ-
omy like the Eastern European economies, a post-colonial African economy, a post-
dictatorship Latin American economy, a heavily regulated Asian economy or an eco-
nomically underdeveloped African state.2
The main characteristic of transition economies, from an economic point of
view, is the complexity of challenges and changes that these economies experience.
1 I use the term emerging economies and transition economies interchangeably.
2 Examples of some transition/emerging market economies are: Brazil, Chile, China, India, Mexico,












The thesis analyses the four cornerstones of macroeconomic policy in transition
economies. Therefore, to study transition economies, one needs to capture their com-
plexity by analysing the impact of public policy on long run growth (Chapter 3), short
run uctuations in output, employment and labour productivity (Chapter 4), external
constraints (Chapter 5), and most of all, the political economy of transition (Chapter
2).
In Chapter 2, the thesis considers a theoretical model of the political economy
of conict which are relevant to transition economies. Chapter 3 analyses the chal-
lenges of generating long-term growth for transition economies emerging from con-
ict. I focus on both economic and social infrastructure which is usually adversely
affected due to conict. Furthermore, I state that infrastructure expenditure is an
aspect of public policy that has consequences for long term growth for the economy.
Chapter 4 analyses the short run uctuations in transition economies which are
affected by monetary and scal policy. I show that these short run uctuations and the
respective policy response has implications for long-term stability and growth. This
is a continuation of Chapter 3 on the challenges of generating long term growth for
transition economies. Chapter 5 completes the analysis by considering the external
conditions that transition economies experience by estimating correlations between
external shocks, internal policy and currency volatility.
The intention of the thesis is to provide a complete picture to enrich our under-












South Africa (SA) is a transition economy. It has characteristics of a developing
and developed economy. The high level of inequality and infrastructure constraints3
faced by South Africa are similar to developing countries while South Africa's -
nancial markets are similar to developed economies.4 Some of the institutional and
macroeconomic challenges faced by SA are related to the high and in some cases
rising levels of inequality, capacity constraints in the face of a growing economy,
cyclical variation in output with adverse consequences for employment and general
uncertainty in the economic prospects of the economy reected in a volatile real ex-
change rate.
Currently, the literature does not adequately address these issues encountered
by transition economies. This thesis lls a part of this gap by focusing on some of
the broad themes of development in order to shed some light on the challenges ex-
perienced by transition economies along their developmental trajectory. The study
outlines some of these challenges from political economy, specically the realloca-
tion of resources between different segments of society and possible conict arising
thereof, to long term public policy in the form of infrastructure development and then
to short-term macroeconomic stabilization policy in the face of technology shocks
3 Fedderke and Bogetić (2008) perform a benchmarking analysis on the quality of South Africa's
infrastructure and show that although some of South Africa's infrastructure resembles that of a de-
veloping economy, other infrastructure such as some roads and the quality of private schools and
hospitals are similar to that of a developed economy.











and, nally, to an open-economy framework by analyzing the impact of macroeco-
nomic fundamentals on the volatility of the real exchange rate. More specically, the
issues we cover in the subsequent chapters are as follows.
A reallocation of resources between groups in society usually occurs during the
transition from a developing to a developed economy. Chapter 2 provides a theoreti-
cal framework that allows for the reallocation of resources between two segments of
society - the privileged and the disadvantaged. Each member of the privileged soci-
ety, by denition, is assumed to have more resources than a representative individual
of the disadvantaged group. The privileged agent has a choice of either allocating
resources to their own productive capacity by extracting resources from the disad-
vantaged, or enhance the productive capacity of the disadvantaged by allocating their
own resources to the disadvantaged. Redistribution to the disadvantaged can increase
the productive capacity of society, but comes at the cost of rising political aspirations
of the poor, which erodes the power of the privileged.
Thus the model explicitly rests on the expectation that the strategic interaction
between the social groups is characterized by a tension between antagonistic conict
over resources, and the possibility of increasing the size of the social pie through
an optimal distribution of resources between rich and poor. This tension may result
in a wide range of conict forms that is empirically observable. We present two
contrasting case studies - South Africa and Sri Lanka. The two cases are useful in











The possible equilibria generated by the model provide possible outcomes soci-
eties may realize. The results of the model account for varying degrees of intensity of
conict, from genocide to perpetual conict (as experienced in Sri Lanka) to trans-
fer of power (as in South Africa in 1994). A nonlinear relationship in the transfer
of resources between the privileged and disadvantaged emerges. We nd that the
privileged maximize extraction (minimize redistribution) where the disadvantaged
constitute either a small minority, or a large majority and/or the ratio of resources of
the rich to the poor, is either low, or high. The results are robust to different spec-
ications of the utility function. The implication of this model is that demography,
initial resource distribution and the structure of the economy matter in determining
the political outcome of economies.
The second challenge faced by transition economies this thesis addresses is lim-
ited infrastructure development. This is more keenly felt in countries in post-conict
situations. Inadequate infrastructure raises the price of moving goods and convey-
ing services over distance. Capacity constraints due to limited physical infrastructure
may be experienced by some rapidly growing transition economies. South Africa, is
one such example of a country experiencing this. This places South Africa in an im-
mediate competitive disadvantage. Chapter 3 analyses the impact of economic and
social infrastructure on economic growth in South Africa.
South Africa is one example of a transition economy experiencing increasing











case study to test the model. Given that infrastructure development in SA has oc-
curred in stages (by type of physical infrastructure) over the decades, we construct an
index measuring the level of physical infrastructure. We examine the relationship be-
tween GDP, the economic infrastructure, social infrastructure and private investment
rates. The research question we answer is: Does social and economic infrastructure
lead growth or is it merely responding to increasing growth rates in South Africa?
The literature suggests that infrastructure investment is deemed to increase the
growth potential of an economy by increasing the economy's productive capacity.
Infrastructure development may affect output directly as an additional factor of pro-
duction and/or indirectly by increasing the productivity of private capital. We develop
a theoretical model that conrms this. The model also highlights the possible positive
feedback effects from output and private investment to economic infrastructure.
However, public capital may crowd out private investment and therefore re-
duce GDP growth. Chapter 3 nds this to be true for both economic and social
infrastructure expenditure in South Africa. Moreover, the results nd that social
infrastructure investment has no effect on output in South Africa. The analysis re-
veals positive feedback effects on economic and social infrastructure expenditure
from shocks to GDP.
All economies, including transition economies, experience uctuations in GDP
growth in the short-run. Real business cycle models characterize these uctuations











positive correlation between employment and labour productivity. Chapter 4 consid-
ers uctuations in GDP, employment and labour productivity growth, for a particular
transition economy - South Africa. We nd negative comovement between employ-
ment and labour productivity from the 1990s onwards. This is contrary to standard
business cycle theory. The implication is that technology shocks in South Africa may
not be generating recognizable business cycles.
The salient question is: What is the characteristic of the South African econ-
omy (and perhaps other transition economies) that standard real business cycle mod-
els do not take account of? We suggest that transition economies, in the process of
opening their economies, face less competitive pressure than developed economies.
For example, the South African manufacturing industry has been plagued by high
markups approximately twice as large as the US.5 High markups in SA manufactur-
ing arise from high concentration ratios6 and monopolistic practices. This evidence
indicates that the degree of imperfect competition in the South African manufactur-
ing industry is higher than the US. Given that the standard real business cycle models
assume perfect competition, it may be useful to analyze business cycles in transition
economies by allowing for sticky prices and imperfect competition in the product
market.
Therefore, the structure of transition economies may be consistent with new-
Keynesian models characterized by monopolistic competition and sticky prices, al-
5 See Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2007).











lowing for variable effort. Chapter 4 uses the Gali (1999) new-Keynesian model
which assumes monopolistic competition and sticky prices. Using this model, we
nd the implication for ination, real money balances, real interest rate together with
employment, output and labour productivity as a result of technology and demand
shocks support the South African data.
A nuance of this analysis is the examination of the parameter values of the
model which generate specic empirical results. For example, a demand shock has
a positive effect on employment and labour productivity if and only if we have in-
creasing returns to labour. The model and empirical results conrm the importance
of monetary accommodation, the degree of price stickiness in the product market,
the magnitude of the markup and returns to labour in determining the behaviour of
employment and labour productivity in response to technology shocks. The results
stress that standard real business cycle theory will be unable to explain macroeco-
nomic uctuations in employment, labour productivity, output, prices and the real
interest rate in transition economies experiencing price stickiness, imperfect compe-
tition and a monetary policy regime that is unlike developed economies.
Chapter 5 presents evidence illustrating the relatively high volatility of real
exchange rates in transition economies vis-à-vis developed economies. The higher
volatility in the exchange rate is associated with three stylized facts. Firstly, the open-
ing of transition economies is reected in increasing proportion of their GDP being











their balance of payments. Secondly, most of these economies have moved towards
manufactured exports from primary commodity exports, making them more sensi-
tive to exchange rate movements. Lastly, transition economies are subject to large
nominal shocks because they have non-credible monetary institutions and weak s-
cal position.7 These nominal shocks are reected in excessive exchange rate vari-
ability. Moreover, these economies face increased exposure to abrupt reversals in
capital ows. The instability associated with short-term capital ows is reected in
the countries' exchange rate gyrations. Sudden capital outows have resulted in the
Mexican crisis of 1995 through to the Asian/Russian/Brazilian crises of 1997-98.
Exchange rate volatility adversely affects, among other things, private invest-
ment which consequently slows growth. Chapter 5 considers what factors affect ex-
change rate volatility in transition economies. It investigates the long run impact of a
set of macroeconomic fundamentals together with external factors on real exchange
rate volatility for a panel of transition economies. The estimation technique used to
determine the relationship between real exchange rate volatility and the set of ex-
planatory variables allows us to test if the particular panel of transition economies
respond, in the long run, in a similar fashion to a change in a particular macroeco-
nomic fundamental.
We nd evidence that a deteriorating current account and scal balance, and
increased terms of trade volatility increases real exchange rate volatility. Current











account decits indicate the inability of savings, both private and public, to meet pri-
vate and public investment needs. Insufcient savings are indicative of budget decits
and/or high debt to GDP ratios. Thus the current account decits are a symptom of
macroeconomic imbalances. We also nd a non-linear relationship between the level
of reserves and currency volatility with a rising reserve level reducing volatility at a
decreasing rate. The data reveals that the optimal level of reserves is 4 1
2
months of
import cover. The main conclusion of the study advocates for good governance, ef-
cient institutions and the creation of an enabling environment in order to inuence
the risk-adjusted return on investment and reduce the volatility of capital ows and,
in turn, reduce currency volatility.
The chapters in this thesis trace some of the issues faced by transition economies.
In general, the thesis provides a rationale for the institutional and macroeconomic dy-
namics experienced by transition economies along their growth path. It also offers a
possible explanation why political and economic outcomes may differ amongst this
group of economies. The importance of prudent macroeconomic policy by sound in-














Most theories of conict posit that resource transfers from elites to the disadvantaged
represent an attempt to purchase social stability by foregoing some of the benets
of privilege. This Chapter suggests that such resource transfers carry the reverse
benets: a gain in the productive resources available to the elite, but at the cost of a
loss in political inuence and hence control over societies' resources and direction.
The notion that resource transfers are a means of buying political peace by
elites is relatively wide-spread in the literature.8 That such transfers, specically
human capital provision to the poor, might be motivated by productivity gains aligned
with the self-interest of elites, while rarer, can also be identied in the literature.9 But
that the productivity gains of human capital transfers to the poor will be bought at
the expense of a loss of inuence by the elite and that it may be rational to forego
inuence for the sake of productive gain, to the best of our knowledge does not nd
expression in the literature.
In this Chapter we are explicitly concerned with the characterization of con-
ict forms. Specically, what might come to account for the very wide range of
8 See for instance Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Bertocchi and Spagat (2004).











conict that is empirically observable, often with surprising dynamic developments?
Societies that begin under auspices that suggest cataclysm reach peaceful accommo-
dation; while others that should by all accounts bask in peace nd themselves mired
in long term blood-letting. This Chapter derives the possible political outcomes for
society under which the rich will redistribute to the point of equality with the poor;
conditions under which the disadvantaged face genocide; as well as the range of in-
termediate redistributive activity likely to be employed by the privileged.
We begin by sketching our motivation in constructing the theoretical model
of the Chapter by considering two contrasting case studies - South Africa and Sri
Lanka. The two case studies are useful in suggesting the core features of our model
- the heart of which is the trade-off between the productivity gains for society and
rising political aspirations of the poor associated with human capital transfers to them
by social elites already outlined above. The model allows a wide range of feasible
conict forms, from complete accommodation to complete annihilation to emerge,
and identies the circumstances associated with each.
2.1.1 Motivation
In 1985 South Africa appeared well on the way to political cataclysm. The then South
African president delivered a speech in August renouncing the opportunity of reform-
ing the Apartheid state. By 1986 South Africa was in a state of emergency, with state











measures attempting to counter unprecedented levels of civil unrest in the schooling
system, black residential areas, and in politically motivated industrial unrest.
Yet in October 1990, a new South African President released black political
prisoners, unbanned black opposition parties that had been outlawed for 30 years, re-
pealed Apartheid laws, and placed a moratorium on state repression. April 1994 saw
the rst fully democratic elections in South Africa, conducted essentially peacefully,
leading to the inauguration of the rst black President under one of the worlds' most
liberal constitutions.
Unlike South Africa, Sri Lanka is currently mired in conict.10 The conict
waged in the North and East of the country is between the minority Tamils and ma-
jority Sinhalese. At rst glance the hostilities between the two communities may be
classed as an ethnic conict. However, an important feature of Sri Lanka's conict is
the historical development of conict between as well as within communities, giving
birth to a twin civil war (Abeyratne 2004, Bardhan 1997, Stewart et al 2001, Stew-
art, and O' Sullivan 1999). Conict is present not only between the Sinhalese and
Tamils, but also within the Sinhalese community, erupting into an armed struggle in
the 1980s. This conict, which has been suppressed and is now non-violent, still ex-











ists.11 The implication is that the current conict is not simply rooted in differences
in ethnicity.12
The South African case is a story of remarkable transformation - `miraculous'
in the eyes of many commentators - while the Sri Lankan case is just another example
of a developing economy struggling with the pressures of attaining higher levels of
economic growth heading towards political conict.
Might one be able to explain why one country chose peace while the other
chose war? If so, what are these factor(s) that result in divergent political outcomes
for countries along their developmental trajectory? Are there lessons to be learnt
from the experiences of these countries?
The modern political economy literature suggests at least four possible ap-
proaches to answering these questions.
The rst locates political transitions in a long tradition which assigns the trig-
ger for change to a moment of economic crisis, and due to an underlying class
11 In 1971, there emerged an insurrection, organized by the youth of the Sinhala community to cap-
ture state power. The Sinhala community is the main ethnic group of the country accounting for nearly
three-fourths of the total population. The Sinhala community is concentrated largely in the southern
part of the country. The militant organization of the Sinhala youth, known as the JVP (Janatha Vimuk-
thi Peramuna, or People's Liberation Front), after its rst aborted attempt, dissolved temporally. The
JVP arose again by the early 1980s and made their second attempt launching an armed struggle from
1986 to 1989 capture state power. The JVP continues as an important political force.
12 Abeyratne (2004) suggests that ethnicity could well be only a mobilization device rather than
the root cause of conict. The intra- and inter-ethnic characteristics of conict in Sri Lanka raises
the question of how the elite is constituted in Sri Lanka. The elite in South Africa were (and to
some extent still are) dened by race. In Sri Lanka it is not so simple to dene the privileged. The
privileged in Sri Lanka (post-independence) - were the aristocratic class - the so-called mandarins.
This class of indigenous Sri Lankans occupied powerful positions in the administration under the











conict.13 The approach receives full formal treatment in Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001),14 in which an elite and the poor of a society are engaged in a strategic interac-
tion which can result in regime change. In nondemocratic regimes, the elite excludes
the poor from political power, but face a revolutionary threat from the poor during
economic downturns, since the cost of turmoil is lower during recession, while revo-
lution offers the opportunity of moving to a democratic state in which the poor (as the
majority) can enforce redistribution through the scus. The elite's defence against the
revolutionary threat by means of preemptive redistribution of resources to the poor
effectively raises the cost of revolt. Democratic states enfranchise the poor, and en-
gage in redistribution through the scus. They also face the threat of instability, in
the form of coups mounted by the former elite, where the level of redistributive tax-
ation becomes sufciently punitive to render the cost of a coup no longer prohibitive
to the elite.
The crucial feature of the Acemoglu and Robinson (henceforth ARM) model
is the degree of income inequality. Both nondemocracies and democracies can be
consolidated only when inequality is sufciently moderate, such that political insta-
bility increases in the degree of inequality.15 Further, redistribution is greatest neither
for very high nor under low degrees of inequality, but at intermediate levels of in-
13 The hypothesis is venerable, but see for example Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Przeworski et al
(1996), and Rustow (1970).
14 Earlier contributions include Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
15 Consistent with the empirical ndings in Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Muller and Seligson
(1987). Thus the model diverges from the modernization hypothesis of Lipset (1959), though it is
consistent with the Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) suggestion that poor coutnries would have more











equality. The ARM claims that the elite will engage in a preemptive redistribution
of resources to the poor in order to avoid a revolutionary threat by the poor, thus
effectively raising the cost of revolt.
Attraction of the ARM framework is the explicit behavioural treatment of the
strategic interaction between the social groups in a full dynamic setting, which cap-
tures the potential for both stability and instability of democratic and nondemocratic
regimes alike, in effect an endogenous emergence of institutions and their degree
of persistence.
While the original framework aimed at comparing the relative stability of Eu-
ropean and Latin American democracies, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) contains
an explicit application to the South African transition. The inference drawn is that
the South African transition is attributable to declining income inequality after 1970,
while the maximum costs of repression consistent with repression were rising. Based
on the ARM framework, the symmetric reasons for the rising conict in Sri Lanka
should be rising levels of inequality and declining costs of repression.
However, in Sri Lanka, inequality has been declining since the 1930s with the
introduction of universal franchise in 1931 in Ceylon. Active redistribution in Sri
Lanka developed along the lines of a welfare state. The transfer of human capital











thus relatively early.16 This implies that (on the basis of the ARM model) conict
should have been avoided. Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 illustrate the case.










































average years of schooling
gini
Source: World Income Inequality Database and Barro-Lee.
Figure 2.1: Sri Lankan Average years of Schooling and Gini Coefcient
It is also not apparent that the ARM is adequate to the South African case study,
for at least two reasons. First, as Figure 2.2 illustrates, evidence in favour of falling
income inequality in South Africa is by no means clear post 1970,17 with evidence
of improvements occurring only after the start of the process of political transition.
The measure of income inequality depicted in Figure 2.2 is consistent with other
16 The transfer of human capital to the disadvantaged was manifested in free education from primary
to university level (including free mid-day meals and milk at school, later free uniforms and textbooks)
covering the entire country. This in turn is claimed to have resulted in a declining importance of class
and ethnic identity formation (Hettige, 1992).
17 Of course, the persistent difference in relative incomes is consistent with a rising share of total out-











Human Development Record of Sri Lanka
Category 1960 1998
Infant mortality rate (per 1000) 71 16
Life expectancy at birth (years) 62 74
Primary school enrolment (%) 95 100
Adult literacy rate (%) 75 91
Human development index 0.48 0.73
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (annual issues) and
UNDP, Human Development Report (annual issues)
Table 2.1: Sri Lankan Educational Attainment
measures of income inequality in South Africa.18 Second, and crucially, the transfer
of human capital to the black population in South Africa began relatively early under
Apartheid, with a strong increase at the latest during the 1970's - see the evidence of
Figure 2.3.
Under the ARM, the justication for the rising human capital transfer in South
Africa would be as an attempt by the white elite to pacify black political ambition
through redistribution. But this is difcult to reconcile with the evidence. First,
note that the transfer of the human capital precedes the spike in activism for political
transformation of the 1980's - see the political instability index reported in Figure 2.4.
One interpretation of this evidence is that expanding educational opportunity was
18 See Bhorat, Leibbrandt, Maziya, Van der Berg and Woolard (2001). However, as Hoogeven and
Özler (2003) show, the evidence in faovur of falling inequality and poverty post-1994 is also mixed,











Source: Bhorat et al (2001: 2)
Figure 2.2: Ratio of Black to White Per Capita Income in South Africa
itself responsible for the rising, and ultimately uncontrollable political aspirations by
the disadvantaged exposed to new ideas.19
Tellingly, for South Africa empirical evidence suggests that causality runs from
increasing black secondary schooling output to political instability, with a robust pos-
itive sign, consistent with an hypothesis of rising political aspirations under expand-
ing education - see the evidence reported in Fedderke and Luiz (2008).20.
19 The link is well established in the political science literature. One author states this link as follows:
Social and economic change . . . extend political consciousness, multiply political demands,
broaden political participation. These changes undermine traditional sources of political authority
and traditional political institutions . . . The result is political instability and disorder. The primary
problem of politics is a lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic
change (Huntington, 1968:5).




















































































Source: Fedderke and Luiz (2002)
Figure 2.3: Black School Enrolment Rate
A symmetrical case can be made for Sri Lanka - see Abeyratne (2004), Wick-
ramesinghe (1991).21 The democratic political system of the country was instru-
mental in expanding the welfare state regardless of the scal decit or the level of
economic growth (Abeyratne, 2004).22 This welfare transfer had the unintended con-
sequence of increasing the productivity of the disadvantaged segment of Sri Lankan
society.23 But as neither the Sinhala nor the Tamil were politically, socially, culturally
or economically homogeneous communities, there was a conict of interests between
different segments in each community (Abeyratne 1998, 2004, Kloos 1993). It is this
21 See also Wickramesinghe (2001) and Wickramesinghe (2006).
22 To a great extent, the political competition among political parties was instrumental in the initiation
as well as the expansion of the welfare system (Alailima, 1997).
23 The Singaporean Prime Minister at the time - Lee Kuan Yew - was full of praise for the welfare












Source: Fedderke et al (2001)
Figure 2.4: Political Instability Index for South Africa
conict of interests that is held to be responsible for the increasing instability of the
Sri Lankan political system (Abeyratne, 2004).
What might account for the human capital transfer in the face of evidence
that this was inconsistent with repressive and non-participatory political structures
in South Africa? One answer lies in the fact that the human capital transfer was nec-
essary for the productive needs of the economy - see the evidence presented in Fed-
derke (2006). The white elite transferred human capital in the face of a choice tension
- rising political aspirations under rising human capital endowments of the disadvan-











productive capacity of the economy under the improved efciency of labour inputs
into production.24
Conict over land may arise in both South Africa and Sri Lanka but the moti-
vation of such conict arises as individuals gain knowledge of property rights as their
endowment of human capital increases due to transfers from the privileged. Thus the
catalyst for conict is the transfer of resources, in this case human capital.
This productivity-aspirations trade-off is not captured in the ARM framework.
An alternative approach of conceptualizing conict is provided by the Hirsh-
leifer (1995) model of anarchy (henceforth HAM).25 Under the HAM, agents are
engaged in ght over a pool of resources, and each agent faces a choice of either
allocating resources to the purpose of producing output, or to a ghting technology
designed to extract resources from the other (equivalently: prevent extraction by the
other agent). What is useful about the HAM is that it serves to characterize con-
ict, and identies conditions under which perpetual conict can be a stable outcome
(essentially low efciency of ghting technology), and can generate a range of inten-
sity of conict in the equilibrium solution (as the efciency of ghting technology
varies). By inference, there exist alternative outcomes in which stable non-conictual
equilibria emerge, but only under either the complete victory of one of the contesting
agents, or as an explicit Hobbesian intervention by the state.
24 Note that for Galor and Moav (2004), the complementarity between physical and human capital
they suggest as crucial to the second phase of the industrial revoluion, has rendered the need for human
capital transfers to the poor as pervasive, with the consequence of eliminating or at least attenuating
social conict substantially.











The attraction of the framework lies in the fact that an obvious way of think-
ing of the South African transition might be of a protracted period of stable conict
between black and white, during which neither side had sufciently decisive tech-
nology to ensure victory. However, steadily the balance of power might have swung
to the black majority, either as their population preponderance grew over time (see
for instance the racial fractionalization index26 for South Africa reported in Figure
2.5), or as whites lost the technological advantage in the contest - perhaps through
the force of extensive international technological and nancial sanctions.27




























































































Racial Fract. Relig. Fract. Lang. Fract. Pol. Instability
Source: Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2007)
Figure 2.5: Fractionalization in South Africa
26 Fedderke, De Kadt and and Luiz (2007) calculate these fractionalization indicies by calculating the
probability that any two individuals randomly selected froma sample are from the same racial group.











Similarly, the HAM methodology also appears attractive in dening the pro-
tracted Sinhala-Tamil conict in arguing that no conclusion has been reached as nei-
ther side has a sufcient advantage in ghting technology. The methodology may
also explain why the Sinhala youth rebellion of the 1980s was effectively suppressed,
with the latter having insufcient military technology to engage in an armed struggle.
However, the HAM is also not satisfactory in capturing the South African case
study experience. First, it is entirely unable to account for the possibility that agents
may choose to redistribute resources to their opponents. Under the ARM, the priv-
ileged can do so in the form of welfare (not productivity enhancing) payments, but
under the HAM such active transfers are never feasible.28 Likewise, for Sri Lanka,
the welfare transfer to the disadvantaged majority by the aristocratic elite is not ex-
plained by the HAMmodel. Second, the political transition did not eliminate conict
- while political instability has fallen off dramatically, crime as a social pathology
remains high, and nancial markets show evidence of continued high risk premia at-
taching to South African nancial instruments - see Figure 2.6 for a new measure of
uncertainty, and Figure 2.7 for a comparison with the political instability measure of
Figure 2.4. In Sri Lanka as well, the suppression of the Sinhala militant uprising has
also not eliminated conict completely.29 Thus the transition is less a case of com-
28 Unless one counts low defences against predation by one's opponent as an effective transfer.
29 The JVP are still vociferous in their demands for a more equitable share of the country's output
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Source: Fedderke and Pillay (2007)
Figure 2.6: Theoretically Consistent Measure of Risk
The third conceptual framework useful to our question is provided by a model
by Bourguignon and Verdier (2005)31 (henceforth BVM) which explores the polit-
ical economy of education and development. In this framework the political elite
has an incentive to transfer human capital to the disadvantaged determined through
30 In a framework that is reminiscent of the HAM, Bates et al (2007) discuss equilibria in both
state and stateless societies where coercion (violence) may be employed to defend against and for
predation. The implication is that coercion, if efciently organized may be socially productive and
a source of increased welfare. The model endogenously determines whether the state is predatory
or developmental. While a suggestive extension, the model has incomplete purchase on the South
African transition experience, since the state, through its coercion hindered transformation, rather
than fostering it.





























































Source: Fedderke and Pillay (2007)
Figure 2.7: Comparing Risk Measures
a productivity gain realized by the poor. This ts the reason suggested above for the
human capital transfers in South Africa, and the development of the Sri Lankan wel-
fare state. Moreover, the transfer of human capital to the disadvantaged can result
in their gaining access to political power. A particular concern in the BVM frame-
work, is the impact of trade liberalization and the integration of international factor
markets on the incentive of the privileged to transfer human capital to the poor - with
liberalization introducing a non-monotinicity in the transfer of human capital by di-
minishing the incentive in the short run, raising it in the long run.
There is nevertheless a twofold and crucial divergence from the South African
experience in the BVM. First, in the BVM the transfer of human capital typically











voting rights. Yet in South Africa over the period where increasing human capital
was being transferred to the black majority in South Africa (recall again Figure 2.3),
political rights were increasingly withdrawn from the black majority. Figure 2.8
reports a political rights index for South Africa, which shows that rights only began
improving in South Africa well into the 1980s, after a few decades of human capital
transfers. The human capital transfers did not issue in the realization of political
rights - instead they led to increased aspirations for such rights, with the continued
denial of the rights leading to the sporadic political upheaval detailed in Figure 2.4
above.
Source: Fedderke et al (2001)











Source: Aron and Muellbauer (2007)
Figure 2.9: Openness Index for South Africa,
The continuous welfare transfers post-independence in Sri Lanka (especially
human capital transfers via subsidization of education) along with universal franchise
have led to increasing peoples' aspirations for increased political rights as indicated
in the BVM model. However, as in South Africa, these aspirations did not translate
into effective political rights. Instead, as with South Africa, increased restrictions on
political participation were introduced and measures such as the change in the consti-
tution to allow for a president with executive powers was introduced in 1977. See the
evidence of Figure 2.10, which reports the Freedom House and Polity standardized
measures of rights.
Second, the BVM framework is useful in that it allows for a changing income











Source: Freedom House and Polity Standardized Scales
Figure 2.10: Rights in Sri Lanka
model is not the human capital transfer, but in the nal instance a shift in relative
prices between unskilled labour intensive manufactures, and skilled labour intensive
manufactures that results from the process of trade liberalization.32 It is the relative
price change which leads to a reallocation of human capital. But in the South African
instance it is not possible to argue that the reallocation of human capital is one related
to changing rates of return across sectors. Figure 2.9 conrms that the openness of
the South African economy has varied substantially over the 1970-2000 period,33 but
nevertheless, price cost margins both for the South African manufacturing sector as
32 In Bourguignon and Verdier (2000a) inquality also plays a role - but for the South African context
we have already dismissed this as a feasible driver.











a whole, as well as for individual sectors has remained essentially constant over this
period - see the evidence in Aghion et al (2006).
As indicated earlier, political pressure and not the relative price change was the
cause of the reallocation of human capital through the welfare system in Sri Lanka.
The country remained relatively closed from 1956-1977 with import substitution
policies along with the continuation of a welfare state (begun post-independence)
being strictly adhered to. Thus changes in relative prices resulting from trade liber-
alization could not be the cause of changing income shares between the `mandarins'
and the rest of the Sri Lanka populace. Moreover, political tension in Sri Lanka esca-
lated into the twin civil war a few years after the introduction of the liberalized trade
regime in 1977 (Abeyratne, 2004).34
An alternative to the ARM-type model of class conict is provided by Galor
and Moav (2004) - henceforth GaMM. In the GaMM an elite transfers human capi-
tal to the working class due to complementarity between physical and human capital.
The consequence is that the conict between capitalists (the elite) and workers (the
poor) that characterized the rst phase of the industrial revolution in Europe is over-
come in the industrial revolution's second phase, since the working class realizes
productivity, hence wage gains that render industrial conict redundant.
34 Although some political analysts have argued that the civil war in Sri Lanka is mainly a product
of the distributional conseqeunces of trade liberalization (see Gunasinghe 1984, and Dunham and
Jayasuriya 2000), the continued strong performance of the Sri Lankan economy despite the civil war











For the South African case the evidence does support the productivity pay-off
to human capital, and hence the incentive to transfer human capital to the poor that
the GaMM suggests. But as already pointed out above for the BVM, the human
capital transfer in South Africa led to rising political aspirations, hence conict and
ultimately the overthrow of the political system, rather than an abatement of political
tension. In Sri Lanka, the human capital transfer led to rising political aspirations
and hence conict.
While the rst four frameworks by which one might characterize the South
African transition and the Sri Lankan failure to exit conict are theoretical, the fth
is empirical. Collier, Hoefer and Rohner (2006)35 (henceforth CHRM) undertakes
an empirical examination of a range of potential drivers of civil war. Drawing on
a variant of the HAM, the approach balances feasibility36 against motivation.37 The
ndings are that both feasibility and motivation do indeed matter. According to their
estimations conict is driven by: the level of per capita income, the presence of
natural resources, population size, the degree of fractionalization, whether a country
had been a French colony, the proportion of the population that is male and aged
between 15 and 29, and the proportion of the country that is mountainous.
35 See also Collier and Hoefer (2006).
36 They cite the Machiavelli Theorem of Hirshleifer (2001): no protable opportunity for violence
will go unused. Feasibility includes nancial (rebellion is expensive), military, and geographical
dimensions.











Again, however, the framework does not cover the South African and Sri Lankan
experiences well. For both countries, of the factors that prove signicant in CHRM,
only per capita income, population size, fractionalization and the proportion of young
males in the population could plausibly account for the political transition: all other
factors are xed. Yet every one of these measures bar one in South Africa moved so
as to increase, not decrease the likelihood of conict: per capita income fell, popu-
lation grew, young males grew more numerous - only fractionalization fell, and then
only racial, and not linguistic or religious fractionalization. Unless we are therefore
prepared to accept the uni-causal explanation, that it was the rising proportion of the
black population that drove the transition, the CHRM framework is also incomplete
as an account of South Africa's experience.
Conversely, in the case of Sri Lanka, income per capita has been rising post
1977 and thus the conict should be subsiding and not escalating. The relative pop-
ulation sizes between the two groups has also remained relatively constant implying
ethnic fractionalization has remained relatively xed. Moreover, from 1956, with the
introduction of Sinhala in education and administration, all Sri Lankans were com-
pelled to learn Sinhalese.38 This implies that linguistic fractionalization has declined
reducing the probability of conict in Sri Lanka according to the CHRM model.
38 In addition, the Sri Lankan government in the 1960s introduced a district quota system which
reduced the number of Tamil students entering the universities. This was because the Northern Tamils
were perceived to have an undue advantage over the majority Sinhala students in the south on account
of the number of good English schools set up by the American and British missionaries in the 19th
century resulting in disproportionate admissions to universities, especially in the elds of medicine,











Only the proportion of young males (for both ethnic groups) in the population has
increased (as in the case of South Africa).
Thus for South Africa two variables out of three pointed toward conict, one
toward peace, in Sri Lanka two variables out of three suggested peace, only one
conict. Yet the outcome was peace in South Africa, war in Sri Lanka. It follows
that the CHRM does not readily account for the experience of our two case studies.
2.1.2 The Tasks of this Chapter
In this Chapter we therefore present a new theoretical framework to provide a char-
acterization of conict which might shed light on the divergent cases of South Africa
and Sri Lanka. The model explicitly rests on the expectation that the strategic interac-
tion between social groups is characterized by a tension between antagonistic conict
over resources, and the poss bility of increasing the size of the social pie through an
productively optimal distribution of resources between rich and poor. Required of
the model is the ability to account for varying degrees of intensity of conict, from
potential eradication (genocide) to transfer of power, as in South Africa in 1994. Per-
petual conict (as experienced in Sri Lanka) is also rendered feasible.
As a mark of success in the modeling exercise, we are therefore looking for
two distinct features to emerge:
 That conict can cover a wide range of feasible intensities, from eradication to











 That the strategic interaction between agents be characterized by a trade-off
between an enhancement of productive capacity and rising political aspirations
associated with resource transfers from the privileged to the disadvantaged.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the structural fea-
tures of our model. Section 2.3 presents the core results, Section 2.4 very briey
considers some robustness checks of the results, Section 2.5 discusses the implica-
tions of the model, Section 2.6 analyses the model in terms of the South African and
Sri Lankan experience and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Foundations of the Model
Consider a society with two groups of individuals - the privileged (R) and the dis-
advantaged (P ) where individuals belonging to a particular segment of society are
assumed to be homogenous. Assuming no population growth, let the total popula-
tion in the society equal L = LR+LP where LR and LP equals the population of the
privileged and disadvantaged segments of society, respectively.
Let  represent the ratio of the population of the disadvantaged to privileged
segment of society:






Segmentation of society (privileged versus disadvantaged) is based on the level of per











endowed with more human capital per capita (hR) than the disadvantaged segment
(hP ) of society (hR > hP > 0). The initial level of per capita human capital of
the disadvantaged (hP ) can never equal zero. If it did equal zero, there would be no
disadvantaged group in society. This would make modelling the problem a trivial
exercise.
The privileged have the option to reallocate human capital between the two
segments of society. This implies that the representative individual in the privileged
segment of society may allocate (or expropriate from) a proportion,  of their human
capital endowment hR to the disadvantaged segment. After redistribution privileged
individuals thus hold (1   )hR > 0 human capital, disadvantaged individuals hold
(hP + 

hR) > 0. The  constitutes a proportional tax either on the human capital re-
sources available to the privileged section of society ( > 0) or on the disadvantaged
segment of society ( < 0). Redistribution can be thought of as policies increasing
expenditure on schooling, training and reskilling of the disadvantaged; extraction as
policies that tax the poor in order to allocate the resources to the privileged.
Average per capita human capital for the entire society (h) is given by:39
0 < (hP +


hR) < h =
hR + hP
(1 + )
< (1  )hR (2.2)
Average per capital human capital for the entire society (h) constitutes a poverty
line that differentiates the `haves' from the `have nots' in terms of their respective
holdings of human capital.
39 Using the following denition of aggregate human capital for the entire country:
H = HR +HP =































The upper bound value is given by the point at which redistribution reaches a level
which reverses the relative endowment of human capital (thereby reversing privileged
status), while the lower bound value is given by complete extraction of resources
by the privileged from the poor. The upper and lower bounds of  are illustrated in
Figure 2.11, for alternative values of , hR=hP .40
Figure 2.11: Upper and Lower bounds of delta
Crucial to the model is a concept of power. In one dimension the power of
the privileged is absolute: they are sole arbiters of , which is their core choice











variable. But there is a further manifestation of power, which rests in the ability
of the privileged to appropriate a proportion, !, of the total output produced by the
society. This proportion, which for the remainder of the Chapter is what we refer to
as the power of the privileged, is determined by the endowment of human capital held
by the rich relative to the social average, denoted (r). Equally, however, the poor are
not passive. Specically, any given level of relative human capital endowment held
by the poor relative to the rich, denoted (), translates into an aspiration to exercise
greater discretion over the allocation of resources in society. Aspirations might be
thought of as disadvantaged individuals becoming more knowledgeable about rights
of resistance to any prospective extraction, and being able to use their skills (human
capital) to address collective action problems in resistance more effectively. In effect,
the privileged are characterized by the fact that they exercise choice over the level of
redistribution or extraction (). However, in allocating more human capital to the
poor, they awake aspirations in the poor to power. The implication of this conception
of power is that the relative distribution of human capital between the two sections
of society matters as it determines the intensity of distributional conict between the
two sections of society.
Formally, let ! represent the privileged person's ability to claim a proportion











of the disadvantaged individual's output.41 Then:











Given that both r and  are dened by the relative holdings of human capital by rich
and poor, it follows that both the aspirations of the poor, as well as the power of the
rich depends on a distance measure between rich and poor.
Note that power (!) decreases with respect to rising aspirations (). The 
parameter takes into account the relative number of human capital disadvantaged
individuals and the extent of their poverty (relative endowment of human capital).












,  > 0
and hR > hP > 0.42 Figures 2.12 and 2.13 illustrate variation in !, , as the ratio of
the poor to rich individuals (), and the ratio of rich to poor per capita human capital
(hP=hR) changes respectively.43
For the decision problem of the privileged, we dene the utility function for the
representative individual as:








; +  = 1 (2.7)
41 Symmetrically, 1   ! represents the power held by a representative agent belonging to the disad-
vantaged segment of society.
42 We also note that @=@hR < 0, @=@ > 0, @=@hP > 0 and @=@ > 0. Symmetrically,
@!=@hR > 0, @!=@ < 0, @!=@hP < 0 and @!=@ < 0.












where cR; cP denotes the privileged and disadvantaged per capita consumption re-
spectively.
It remains to characterize the productive base of the economy. We distinguish
between independent (separable) and interdependent production.44 We associate the
distinction with two forms of empirically observable production - agrarian and indus-
trial. Under agrarian production, production units are separable, and can effectively
attain sufciency independently of one another. Industrial production, by contrast is
dened as production under specialization, such that inputs into production are ren-
dered complements, and reliant on trade with one another rather than self-sufcient.
A stylized example would be two villages, which under agrarian production would













produce both steel and corn, while under industrial production comparative advan-
tage would dictate the specialization of each village into the production of one of the
two goods, with trade generating the exchange required by both for survival.
2.2.1 Independent Production
We use a simple growth model with human capital as the only factor of production.
Assume that the two societies production of the privileged and disadvantaged soci-
eties are not interdependent. We obtain this feature by treating the production of the

























where Y denotes total output, A represents technology and  represents returns to
human capital, such that:
 2
8<: > 1 represents increasing returns= 1 represents constant returns< 1 represents decreasing returns
9=; (2.9)
Technology is symmetrical across the two groups. The groups differ only in their
resource endowment, here human capital.
Let yR, yP represent the per capita output of the privileged and disadvantaged
sections of society respectively. Hence:
LRyR = !Y












LPyP = (1  !)Y






















The privileged maximize utility (2.7). Assume for the sake of simplicity that
 = 0, so that the privileged care only about themselves, and not about the poor in
their objective function. We generalize this assumption in Section 2.4. Under these































with rst order condition:






















Continuing to use a simple growth model with human capital as the only factor of
production, we now assume that the privileged and disadvantaged are dependent on
one another, represented by their respective production interacting with one another.
















where notation is dened as above and,  and  represent the elasticity of output with
respect to human capital in the privileged and disadvantaged segments of society,
respectively. Immediately:
( + )2
8<: > 1 represents increasing returns= 1 represents constant returns






















yP = (1  !)A

(1  ) hR




































# 19=; = k (2.21)
where k is dened as for (2.15).
The model presented is a static model. It provides static equilibrium outcomes
which allow for the allocation (or expropriation) of resources by the privileged in
society to (from) the disadvantaged.46 The mechanism of the model is one where by
increased transfers to the disadvantaged group from the privileged group, although
increasing the productive capacity of the privileged group, results in a loss of power
for them due to rising aspirations of the disadvantaged group. This generates the
non-monotonicity in the transfer of resources to the disadvantaged group.47
45 We normalize on LR.
46 A dynamic model would be an interesting addition, but beyond the scope of the propositions
discussed in Section 2.3.
47 For example, with respect to the intra-group conict in Sri Lanka, the privileged Sinhalese man-
darins transferred resources to the disadvantaged Sinhalese majority via subsidies to education and
school feeding programs. This resulted in rising aspirations of the disadvantaged and the increase in











2.3 Three Core Results
We emphasize three results to emerge from our model, which shed light on the initial
problem statement concerning the nature of conict in different societies.
Specically, we identify conditions that determine the intensity of conict, the
possibility of complete accommodation of the disadvantaged by the privileged, and
nally a characterization of intermediate levels of conict between obliteration and
complete accommodation of the disadvantaged.
Proposition 1 (Genocide) The privileged will eliminate the disadvantaged mem-
bers of society provided that production is separable, and that constant or increasing
returns to scale hold in production. Genocide will not emerge under interdepen-
dent production, nor under separable production provided that returns to scale are
decreasing.
Proof. We begin by showing that genocide is necessary under separable production
and constant or increasing returns to scale. Genocide occurs under G =  hP=hR,
since this fully extracts the resources of the poor. For G, k y
R
!










 1   (1  ) hR 1 < 0, such that (2.15) requires  < G,
providing a corner solution.
It remains to show that genocide does not solve the decision problem under





























0, yR ! 0 and hence cR ! 0. This eliminates genocide under interdependent
production, regardless of returns to scale assumptions.
The intuition for the genocide proposition is straightforward. Under separable
production, the only circumstances under which the rich stand to gain from redistri-
bution to the poor, is under decreasing returns to scale. Given constant or increasing
returns, the rich always gain from extracting additional resources from the poor, in
order to allocate them to own production. By contrast, under decreasing returns to
scale and separable production, there is a productivity loss that results from allocat-
ing resources from the poor to the rich. Provided that the power loss that attends
redistribution is not too great, the rich stand to benet from allocating productive re-
sources to the poor, and recovering the loss through the extraction of resources from
an increased level of production. By contrast, where production is interdependent,
the rich simply cannot drive the poor to extinction, since this would eliminate the
possibility to produce for themselves also.
The signicance of the genocide proposition lies in its implications for the
distinction between agrarian and industrial societies, and the forms of conict that
are associated with each. In effect it speaks to the puzzle noted in the introduction
- that the form of conict that we witness both within and between current societies











sensibilities show a heightened awareness of the dangers of genocide - but attempts
at the complete elimination of `enemy' societies are hardly unique in human history.
Cato's delenda est Carthago injunction, nally followed in the most literal manner
is one illustration of many. To cite a few: Assyrian warfare in the eight and seventh
centuries BC, which relied on the razing of cities, and the extermination or complete
enslavement of their populations; the destruction of Troy and its defenders; Genghis
Khan and Timur Lenk (Tamerlane) in their leadership of the Mongolian expansion;
the destruction associated with the Crusades - on both sides, and often with disregard
for the religious conviction of the vanquished; th persecution of the Hugenots in
France, with the massacre of Saint Bartholomew (1572) and the revocation of the
Edict of Nantes; the thirty years war in Germany, with its associated widespread and
extensive destruction.
To be sure, modern conict is often associated with cataclysmic human loss, of-
ten far exceeding in absolute terms that of earlier genocidal conict in its sheer scale.
World War II resulted in up to 60 million deaths. But this is simply a function of
the scale of the conict that industrial society makes possible. In proportional terms,
even conicts that have popular reputations as resulting in untenable casualties, are
mild (in relative terms, of course) by comparison with the examples cited above in
the context of agrarian conict. Thus in World War I military deaths as a percentage
of total mobilized, of the total male populations aged 15-49, and of the total popula-











Central Powers.48 Thus while the absolute numbers killed were unprecedented, the
intensity of conict did not approach the devastation of a Genghis Kahn. Despite the
scale of the human cost resulting from the increased deployment of technology, and
the scale of modern nation states, the most dramatic of modern conicts neverthe-
less was not aimed at the elimination of the enemy - but at the incorporation of the
resources the enemy controlled instead.49
How to conceptualize this difference? The present model provides a means
of accounting for the difference. Agrarian societies with nite land resources face
Malthusian conditions of decreasing returns to scale. Expansion of production of
necessity requires the use of ever more marginal land, with associated decreasing
returns to production. These conditions can be escaped only where there is geo-
graphical room for expansion - allowing for the reproduction of existing production
in what is (for the expanding society) virgin territory, at the expense of incumbent oc-
cupants of the conquered land who must be eliminated in order to realize the constant
returns to scale available to the victor.50
48 See the discussion in Ferguson (1999).
49 It is important to bear in mind that the present framework is a means of characterizing forms of
conict under different resource congurations, and under alternative technologies of production. It
is not a theory of genocide. For instance, pogroms and genocide aimed at Jews are arguably different.
Antisemitism persisists across time, technology and cultures, and thus lies outside of the framework
presented here.
50 (Lamb, 1927:1) writes of Genghis Khan that:
when he marched with his horde, it was over degrees of latitude and longitude instead of miles;
cities in his path were often obliterated, and rivers diverted from their courses; deserts were peopled
with the eeing and dying, and when he had passed, wolves and ravens often were the sole living











Our framework is able to capture this pattern. Under agrarian production, with
separable production between two groups distinguished by their relative endowment
of resources (human capital), the privileged society can postpone the realization of
decreasing returns to scale (effectively mimic constant returns to scale) by the elim-
ination of rival societies.51 Under these conditions, the nature of conict will be
extreme in the sense that the object is the elimination of the rival society, though the
technology of agrarian society may be such as to limit the scale at which the conict
can be conducted. Where there exist extensive geographic opportunities for expan-
sion (the Eurasian steppes, the American west), conict may be protracted and soci-
eties with inferior resources to the expansion ry power may face extended periods of
extreme destruction. However, as soon as the opportunity for unlimited geographical
expansion is eliminated, diminishing returns become binding under agrarian produc-
tion, and the incentive for the expansionary power is no longer the destruction of
poorer societies, but rather their incorporation in order to limit the impact of decreas-
ing returns to scale.
By contrast, under industrial production with complementarity of factors of
production, of workers (the relatively disadvantaged) and managers (the privileged),
destruction of resources no longer falls within the bounds of rational choice. Conict
can be aimed only at the incorporation of additional resources, not at their destruc-
tion.











This model is applicable to the transfer of any resource. Therefore, the model
is generic in the type of resource that is transferred. There is no distinction between
the different types of resources that are transferred since they yield similar outcomes.
what matters is the technology of production.52
The implication of the present discussion therefore is that the declining inten-
sity (as opposed to scale) of conict in history, the shift from attempts to obliterate
enemies to more restrained objectives, is associated with one of two characteristics
of the technology of production: either the move from constant to decreasing returns
to scale under separable production, or the move from separable, to interdependent
production.
Proposition 2 (Equalization) The privileged will redistribute fully, ensuring equal-
ity of per capita human capital between the privileged and disadvantaged, provided














Under separable production, the proof to Proposition [1] shows that for   1,








= 0 and k y
R
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> 0, @  satisfying (2.15).







, for the (2.21) con-
dition, 

   = +(1+) ln [1 + ] > 0, is sufcient, and 

>  =  is necessary.











Intuition in this instance emerges from the trade-off between productivity gains
to be realized from the redistribution of resources from the privileged to the disad-
vantaged, and the rising aspirations and associated power loss that result from the
redistribution. What the present framework demonstrates is that where the relative
productivity of the disadvantaged to the privileged (=) is sufciently large relative
to the level of aspirations in society (), the productive pay-off to the privileged in so-
ciety may be sufcient to outweigh any loss in power resulting from the redistribution
even to the point of equality in relative human capital.
The net result is that the privileged effectively trade away their relative power
superiority in extracting nal output, and share resources in society with the pre-
viously disadvantaged, in order to render society more productive. In effect, they
extract a smaller proportion from a larger pool of resources realized through a human
capital transfer to the poor. This then is the stylized South African case of incorpora-
tion of the poor into the elite.
Proposition 3 (Intensity) The privileged maximize extraction (minimize redistrib-
ution) where (a.) the disadvantaged constitute either a small minority, or a large
majority, and/or (b.) the ratio of the human capital of the rich to the poor, is either
low, or high.













Figure 2.14: Separable Production
Here the trade-off between productive gain and aspirations binds. By contrast,
where the disadvantaged constitute a very small minority, there is no real productive
gain from redistributing resources to the poor. Where the disadvantaged constitute
a sufciently large majority, redistribution comes to represent a danger to the privi-
leged, since rising aspirations of the poor erodes the power of the rich. Only in an
intermediate range of the population proportions, does the productivity gain suf-
ciently compensate for the growth in aspirations and the associated loss in power,
to merit a strong redistributive impulse on the part of the privileged. Figure 2.16 il-
lustrates in cross section for any given ratio of privileged to disadvantaged human











 = 0:25;  = 0:25.
Figure 2.15: Interdependent Production
The trade-off is also apparent in terms of the ratio of the human capital of
the privileged, to that of the disadvantaged. Where the ratio is low, the privileged
attempt to extract further resources from the poor for themselves, to realize the as-
sociated productive gains for themselves directly. Equally however, where the ratio
of privileged to disadvantaged human capital is sufciently high, the disadvantaged
constitute so marginalized a component of production, that the power of the privi-
leged is virtually absolute, and they respond by extracting the maximum from the
disadvantaged. In effect, the disadvantaged become the otsam of society, with no
aspirations at all,  ! 0, such that the extractive power of the privileged is virtu-
ally complete, ! ! 1.53 Proposition [3] implies that the population-weighted ratio of











Figure 2.16: The Trade-off between Aspirations and Productivity Gain
poor to rich per capita human capital is crucial to the degree of extraction by rich or
allocation to poor of human capital. That is, aspirations () matters.
Therefore the equilibrium outcome of the model does vary if a society engages
in industrial production as opposed to agrarian production. Thus the characteristic of
the educated skilled workers are numerous enough, they will then be able to impose the redistribution
of ...income in their favour through a tax on capital. The difference in our paper is that the rich
may decide to redistribute such that equality holds under interdependent production and under a very
special case. In the BVM model complete redistribution is also possible under a very special case,
i.e., if the tax on capital is not too high and if the net return on capital is large enough. One may
think of the tax on capital enforced by the newly skilled workers in the BVM model as the power
parameter for the disadvantaged. If the disadvantaged have enough power (or the rich have too little
power) the productivity gain from redistribution of human capital is lost by the rich to the poor due
to (in our paper) rising aspirations. In the BVM model however, the level of tax is not endogenously
determined. The only thing that determines whether a tax is imposed or not is the number of unskilled
the capitalists decide to educate. In this model, aspirations (tax on the privileged) rises with the
relative number of poor people but there is always a tax on the rich as a result of a rising number of











the production possibilities frontier, which is inuenced by the type of production,
affects the solution to the problem.
The three core results of our model that we have presented thus allow us to
span a wide range of conict intensities, from complete accommodation to complete
elimination of opponents. Importantly, the models allow for the possibility that the
elite of society will transfer resources to the disadvantaged in order to realize pro-
ductive advantage, though there is a cost to be paid in the form of rising aspirations
(hence conict) of the poor under such transfers.
2.4 Robustness of Results to Alternative Objective
Functions of the Privileged
We now consider the robustness of the propositions discussed above to two alterna-
tive conceptions of the objective function of the rich members of society. The two
relevant questions here are: does it matter if the elite cares about the welfare of the
poor (e.g. whether we have an `altruistic' elite)? and does it matter whether we have
a `cultured' elite, in the sense that the advantaged members of society care about the
inherent benets that derive from human capital, as well as the benet from income
per sê?
First, using the utility function for the representative individual in either seg-
ment of society dened in Equation (2.7) we assume  > 0, and  > . This implies











agent belonging to the disadvantaged society, though they do care about the poor to
some extent. Checking for robustness of the propositions, we nd the following:54
 The Genocide Proposition [1] still holds (though it becomes less likely that
Genocide will occur);;
 The Equalization Proposition [2] still holds but at a higher level of aspirations.
This implies that the privileged are willing to lose more power. Thus the
required productive pay-off to the privileged in society is less than when the
privileged are indifferent ( = 0).
 The Intensity Proposition [3] still holds.
Results are thus not sensitive to the presence of an `altruistic', rather than purely
self-interested elite - though conditions are undoubtedly improved in the presence of
an altruistic elite.
Second, we also allow for the possibility that the utility function for the repre-
sentative individual belonging to the privileged segment of society is:









The above utility function indicates that the privileged value human capital in its own
right (being able to appreciate Shakespeare adds to the value of life), thus adding to
their utility. Checking for robustness of the propositions, we nd the following:55
54 Numeric optimization provides the evidence presented.











 The Genocide Proposition [1] still holds; However, genocide is now possible
under decreasing returns to scale in human capital for the independent
production function, as well as under constant and increasing returns;
 The Equalization Proposition [2] still holds but at a lower level of aspirations.
This implies that the privileged are less willing to loose power.
 The Intensity Proposition [3] still holds.
The intuition is not difcult to understand here. A cultured elite needs more
resources to allocate to cultural activity, and this comes at the cost of the poor.
The moral of the story is that the disadvantaged of society should prefer an
elite which is narrowly focussed on the maximization of its monetary wealth - not
an elite that appreciates theatre and opera in its own right. In short, the poor should
strive for an altruistic and venal elite. However, there also exisits the possibility that
under a venal elite, the extraction of resources from the disadvantage in society may
occur sooner in venal societies or transfers to the disadvantaged are marginal in venal
societies.
In our model, if we included different prices for goods sold to poor and rich,
then prices would also matter in determining the steady state reached and hence the
degree and nature of redistribution of human capital. This model assumes that prices
are the same between goods consumed in rich and poor societies and the `effective'











model abstracts from efciency of human capital held by the poor and rich. If the rich
and poor used their human capital allocation with varying degrees of efciency in the
production process, this too would affect the degree and nature of redistribution of
human capital.
However, in broad terms we note that the results of the Chapter are robust to the
possibility that the rich may care about the poor (though less than about themselves),
and to the introduction of a cultured elite.
2.5 Implications of the model
In this section we explore the implications of the core mechanisms and predictions to
emerge from the theoretical formulations presented above, as well as drawing some
inferences for likely patterns of conict that might be predicted from the model.
1. The model has two core mechanisms:
(a) That political aspirations rise in the amount of human capital transferred to
the disadvantaged. The evidence of Figure 2.13 suggests that aspirations
() may be convex in measures of human capital transfers ().
(b) The privileged have an incentive to transfer human capital to the poor in
order to raise the productivity of the poor, which in turn enhances the
income and hence the consumption opportunities of the privileged. (In turn











transferred to the disadvantaged, which raises the aspirations of the poor,
thereby lowering the proportion of total output that the rich can appropriate
for themselves.)
2. The model has the core prediction that the transfer of human capital from rich to
poor (), should decline as the ratio of the poor to the rich population in society
() rises - subject to a potential non-linearity, such that at very low or very high
ratios of disadvantaged to advantaged populations the advantaged members of
society may cease transferring human capital to the poor. Thus a measure for
human capital transfers should be concave in a measure of the ratio of poor to
rich population.
3. It is possible to draw some inferences about the likely patterns of conict that
would be associated with the mechanisms of the model. Specically:
(a) We conjecture that conict should be concave in measures of aspirations
(). At low levels of aspirations, the poor do not have the means of
mounting strong opposition to the advantaged of society. Conversely,
where the human capital endowment of the poor is sufciently high, the
reason for conict has disappeared, since the human capital endowment of












(b) Since for our model, the primitives of aspirations are human capital
transfers and the population ratios of poor to rich, the non-linearity of
conict in aspirations should be observable in the relation to human capital
transfers () and population proportions () also.
2.6 Does the model apply to the South African and the Sri
Lankan experience?
The model draws general conclusions on the likelihood, intensity, and pervasiveness
of conict. By exploring the core predictions to emerge from the theoretical formu-
lations presented above we discuss the possible reasons for the differing intensities
of conict (if conict even exists) between South Africa and Sri Lanka. Since both
economies do not only depend on agriculture and each segment of society depends
on the other to some extent, the discussion focuses on interdependent technology of
production. Thus, industrial production is evident in South African and Sri Lankan
societies, since economic actors in both countries specialise in the production of dif-
ferent goods and services.
The model predicts that political aspirations rise in the amount of human capital
transferred to the disadvantaged; Proposition 3 deals with the intensity of conict.56
Recapping it states:
56 Recall Proposition [3] implies that the population-weighted ratio of poor to rich per capita human











Proposition 3 The privileged maximize extraction (minimize redistribution) where
(a.) the disadvantaged constitute either a small minority, or a large majority,
and/or (b.) the ratio of the human capital of the rich to the poor, is either low, or
high.
For the South African case, the disadvantaged reect a large proportion of the















although rising is not high enough to threaten the the power (!) of the rich to such





after the transfer of human capital to the poor. Moreover, the productivity gain out-
weighs the power loss of the transfer as the blacks constitute a large proportion of the
human capital and therefore some transfer of human capital will generate relatively
large returns to the output of the entire economy.






to 1 between the Sinhalese and Tamils, any redistribution of human capital between
the two communities will result in one community gaining the advantage, i.e., power.
Further, the Tamils constitute a minority of the population. Therefore the produc-
tivity gain from such a transfer yields low returns to productivity ( < 1). Thus the
productivity payoff does not outweigh the power loss. Thus tension arises over who











The salient point is that the conict in Sri Lanka, which may now have devel-
oped into an ethnic war, has its roots in the distribution of resources and the relative
population sizes of the two groups. It is immaterial that Sri Lanka has intra-ethnic
conict while conict in South Africa is characterized by conict between two racial
groups. The trigger for the commencement or cessation of conict is the the distribu-
tion of human capital and the demography of the society. This explains the dichotomy
of the South African and Sri Lankan experience with respect to the results generated
by the model and the degree of conict as espoused by the model.
2.7 Conclusion
This Chapter has presented a model in which two groups in society are engaged in
strategic interaction.
Privileged members of society have the opportunity to allocate resources ei-
ther to their own productive capacity, or to enhance the productive capacity of the
disadvantaged.
Redistribution to the disadvantaged can increase the productive capacity of so-
ciety, but comes at the cost of rising political aspirations of the poor, which erodes the
power of the rich. Results in the Chapter derives conditions under which the rich will
redistribute to the point of equality with the poor; conditions under which the dis-
advantaged face genocide; as well as the range of intermediate redistributive activity











In doing so the Chapter presents a theoretically based diagnostic for the char-
acterization of forms of conict, in terms of likelihood, intensity, and pervasiveness.
An extension to the model presented in Chapter 2 is to test the model on empirical
data to determine if the model's parameters are a good predictor of conict. A fur-
ther extension to the the model is an investigation of the dynamic interaction of these
competing groups in society. This will provide a description of the behaviour of a












Impact of Economic and Social
Infrastructure on Economic Growth
3.1 Introduction
Countries emerging from conict face a myriad of challenges. One challenge is the
rebuilding of their physical infrastructure.57 Backlogs in infrastructure raise the price
of moving goods and conveying services over distance. Deciencies in logistics are
also keenly felt in some transition economies like South Africa (SA). The impor-
tance of infrastructure for growth is widespread in the literature.58 This Chapter in-
vestigates the impact of economic and social infrastructure investment on growth in
South Africa.59
3.1.1 Motivation
Infrastructure is crucial for a country of South Africa's size, with considerable con-
centration of production inland, and which is some distance from major industrial
57 We dene infrastructure as the system of public works in a country, state or region, including
roads, utility lines and public buildings. Source: Handbook on Geographic Information Systems and
Digital Mapping.
58 See Gramlich (1994) and Fedderke and Garlick (2008) for a review of the main studies on the
impact of infrastructure investment.
59 We differentiate between economic and social infrastucture by using the South African Reserve
Bank denition. Economic infrastructure represents items such as roads, bridges, dams, electricity











markets. An indication of limited infrastructure is logistics cost. South Africa's lo-
gistics cost is 15% of GVA whereas her trading partners have logistic cots of only
8.5% of GVA.60 This puts South Africa at an immediate competitive disadvantage.
The higher logistics cost in SA may be due to the declining levels of investment in
economic infrastructure. Figure 3.1 supports this suggestion illustrating the deterio-
ration of government gross investment rates in both economic and social infrastruc-
ture from the mid-70s.61
Source: South African Reserve Bank Bulletin
Figure 3.1: Economic and Social Infrastructure investment rate
60 See Economic Infrastructure Framework Report (2005) of the Department of Trade and Industry,
South Africa.
61 Infrastructure investment rates are calculated by obtaining the gross investment in economic and
social infrastructure investment as a percentage of Gross Value-Added (GVA). Data is obtained from











Given these high logistic costs and pressure on SA infrastructure due to ris-
ing GDP growth, the South African government launched the Accelerated Shared
Growth Initiative for South Africa (Asgi-SA). This policy emphasizes that inade-
quate infrastructure is a constraint to growth.62 The extensive capital expenditure
program the government commenced in 2006 is aimed at improving and increasing
both the efciency and network of country-wide infrastructure needs of the economy.
In the same vein, the SA Cabinet has given its approval for Eskom and Transnet to
undertake approximately R121-billion worth of investment by 2010 with a private
sector target of R44-billion for both sectors  R23-billon for the energy system and
an additional R21-billion for transport. It is estimated that approximately R107-
billion would be needed between 2005 and 2009 to meet South Africa's growing
energy needs. Eskom plans to meet 70% of this requirement, implying an investment
of R84-billion over the next ve years with the balance reserved for possible Inde-
pendent Power Producer (IPP) entrants.63 The planned rate of growth of the capital
budget of government at between 15% and 20% per year is unprecedented in South
African history.64
62 The other topics addressed in Asgi-SA are specic sector strategies, skills development, bridging
the gap between the formal and informal economywith the ultimate elimination the informal economy,
reducing institutional interventions and improving goverance, reducing the volatility of the currency
and to ensure that scal and monetary policy work together to produce sustained and shared growth.
For more details see SA government website http://www.info.gov.za/asgisa/asgisa.htm.
63 See Engineering News, 26 October 2006 article.
64 We emphasize that the growth in the government's capital budget is off a low base due to the steady











A plethora of studies have highlighted the importance of investment in in-
frastructure on growth. Infrastructure expenditure is deemed to increase the growth
potential of an economy by increasing the economy's productive capacity via two
possible channels. Infrastructure expenditure affects output directly, as additional
factor of production, or indirectly by increasing the productivity of private capital.
This implies that productive infrastructure and private capital are `complements' in
production. Thus, a rise in infrastructure capital raises the marginal productivity of
private capital services so that, given the rental price of such services, a larger ow
of private capital services and a larger stock of private assets producing them are
demanded. The rise in the marginal product of capital increases private capital for-
mation, raising private sector output further.
However, infrastructure expenditure need not necessarily have a positive effect
on private investment. In fact, this effect can be negative if infrastructure and private
capital are substitutes. From the investor's perspective, infrastructure capital acts as
a substitute for private capital and `crowds out' private investment.
One needs to test empirically when private and infrastructure stocks are com-
plements or substitutes by estimating a system of equations that highlights the com-
plex webs of association between private and public capital. This is crucial in un-
derstanding the role played by public capital in enhancing growth. Moreover, this











culiarities of each economy determine if public and private capital are complements
or substitutes.
South Africa, being a middle-income country, provides an excellent case study
on the impact of infrastructure on growth in aiding such transition economies. Given
the fact that SA is currently embarking on increasing expenditure on economic in-
frastructure, there have been some studies undertaken on the impact of infrastructure
expenditure on growth.65 To what extent does social and economic infrastructure
lead growth or is it merely responding to increasing growth rates as these transition
economies attain higher growth rates?
Given that infrastructure development in SA has occurred in stages (by type
of physical infrastructure) over the decades, a principal component analysis is con-
ducted on various measures of physical infrastructure to draw a picture of actual
physical infrastructure created over the years. This index provides a picture of the
trends in infrastructure development over the recent past. This Chapter also estimates
a Barro (1990) type growth model which includes social and economic infrastructure
expenditure using South African data. The results indicate the presence of crowding
out effects of economic and social infrastructure expenditure. Social infrastructure
expenditure is also found to have no net effect on GDP in South Africa. The South
African data conrms that the presence of feedback effects from GDP and private
investment to economic and social infrastructure are positive and signicant.











This Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a theoretical exposition
of the model together with an overview of the literature; Section 3.3 provides a brief
historical review of the development of economic and social infrastructure in South
Africa; Section 3.4 analyzes the characteristics of the data, the estimation technique
with results and illustrates the impulse response of per capita output, private and
public investment to a series of shocks; and lastly Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Impact of Economic and Social Infrastructure on
Growth
3.2.1 Theoretical Background
The Chapter adapts the Barro (1990) theoretical model to underpin the interaction of
economic and social infrastructure on growth. This model aims to disentangle the
impact of public sector infrastructure investment from private sector investment in
capital stock. From the theoretical literature, investment in infrastructure is argued to
raise the marginal product of private capital used in production. A nuance this Chap-
ter attaches to the Barro model (1990) is the inclusion of public investment in social
infrastructure. Thus the Chapter is considering an economy in which infrastructure












We construct an endogenous growth model, similar to Barro (1990), in which
the government owns no capital and does not produce services but acquires private-
sector output in order to provide (economic and social) productive services, which
serve as inputs into the private-sector production process. The services are purchased
under a balanced budget constraint, using a at-rate income tax,  , for the provision
of economic and social infrastructure, respectively.
Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology, the labour-intensive production function
is assumed to be:
y = Agk1 ; 0 <  < 1 (3.1)
g = ge g
1 
s ; 0 <  < 1 (3.2)
where y denotes output per worker, g denotes per capita government capital stock in
infrastructure, A > 0 the level of technology and k private capital per worker.66 Un-
like the Barro (1990) model, we disentangle public investment into gs and ge, where
each represents social and economic infrastructure capital stock per worker, respec-
tively. We assume that economic and social infrastructure expenditure are comple-
ments with constant returns to scale in gs and ge.67 We also assume constant returns
to scale in k and g, and between gs and ge.
We also assume a Cobb-Douglass government production function since we
expect government investment expenditure in economic and social infrastructure to
66 Assume k incorporates physical, human and nancial capital.











be complementary. It follows that the marginal products of gsand ge are:
dy=dgs = A (1  ) (ge=gs) (k=g)
1 
=  (1  ) (y=gs) > 0 (3.3)
dy=dge = A (gs=ge)
1  (k=g)
1 
=  (y=ge) > 0 (3.4)
From the government balanced budget constraint we have:
g = psgs + pege = y (3.5)
where ps and pe represent the respective relative prices of gs and ge.68 Barro (1990)
sets prices equal to 1.
Suppose an innitely-lived representative household's utility function is of the
form:
U = ln ct (3.6)
where c is consumption per worker at time t. Assume a constant rate of time pref-
erence,  > 0. Solving the representative household's maximization problem,69 the
steady-state growth rate, denoted by , is:
 = (1  ) (1  )A (g=k)    (3.7)
















68 Relative to the price of output, which is set to equal the price of private capital.






















































> 0 () dy
dge
> pe (3.12)
A clear, theoretical link between output, government infrastructure and social
investment follows. From (3.9) and (3.10), we observe that both economic infrastruc-
ture investment expenditure (ge) and social infrastructure investment expenditure (gs)
can prevent diminishing returns to scale in private-sector capital (k) and raise the rate
of growth of output ().
The results in conditions (3.11) and (3.12) are similar to the Barro (1990) result
in that government intervention of this nature can raise economic growth only within
limits. Once the marginal product of government social or economic infrastructure
expenditure falls below price ps or pe respectively, further increases in gs or ge are
harmful to economic growth, since the tax effect comes to dominate the capital pro-
ductivity effect. The diminishing marginal product of economic and social infrastruc-
ture implies the existence of a plateau effect  with infrastructure capital reaching a











ital productivity effect.70 However, unlike the Barro results the marginal cost of gs
and ge is the price of gs (ps) and ge (pe). Therefore, increases in public capital results
in positive economic growth if the marginal product of public capital is greater than
its marginal cost.
Equally, the exposition identies a possible source for a distinction between
infrastructure and other physical capital  the indirect productivity effect of public
infrastructure on private physical capital stock and vice versa.
This implies that any dge and dgs affects the level of investment in private-





















 (1  ) (@y=@k)
gs
> 0
implying increasing the level of economic and/or social infrastructure expenditure
increases the marginal product of private capital.
Under a model that introduces a rationale for distinguishing public from private
capital, through productivity enhancement of private-sector capital, the expectation
is not only of a direct growth rate impact of changes in public-service provision, but
also of an indirect effect on output and growth through changes in the stock of private-
70 This is similar to the Canning and Pedroni (2004) nding that certain types of infrastructure may











sector capital.71 Thus to capture both the direct and indirect impacts of infrastructure
investment, a systems approach to estimation appears to the most plausible.
3.2.2 Empirical Literature
There exist numerous studies on the impact of infrastructure expenditure on growth
and/or productivity. The academic debate on public infrastructure was stimulated
by Aschauer (1989). Hall and Jones (1999) also provide a detailed anlaysis on the
positive impact of infrastructure expenditure on economic growth. Table 3.1 shows
the results of various papers using a variety of methodologies in analyzing the impact
of infrastructure.72
The various methodologies indicate that there do exist positive spin-offs from
infrastructure expenditure on output, private investment and/or labour productivity.
However, each econometric approach used to study the relationship between in-
frastructure expenditure and growth does yield results that diverge signicantly in
terms of either the magnitude of the effect of infrastructure expenditure on output
and/or if a positive relationship is signicant or not.
The production function approach adopted by Aschauer (1989) and Munnell
(1990) captures public capital stock as an additional input factor in a production
function. This approach yielded results `that were just too good to be true' (Aaron,
71 Note that @
2(@y=@k)
@g2e
< 0 and @
2(@y=@k)
@g2s
< 0. This may be a theoretical expanation for the
crowding-out effect of government expenditure.
72 See Fedderke and Garlick (2008) for a review of the South African literature on the impact of














Aschauer (1989) US Time series,
1949-85
Strong and positive relationship
between productivity and public
investment




Infrastructure capital has a
significant positive effect on long-
run output in both countries
Shah (1992) Mexico Time series,
1970-87
Public infrastructure has positive
multiplier effect on output
Rioja (1998) 7 Latin American
countries
Time series Infrastructure investment has
sizeable positive effects on GDP
and private investment
Ramirez (1998) Chile Time series,
1960-93
Public investment has a positive and




22 OECD countries Panel data,
1970-95
An increase in productive
expenditure significantly enhances
growth






Public investment appears more





Public investment has a significant
and positive effect on private output
Toen-Goet &
Jongeling (1994)
US Time series Public investment on infrastructure
has a significant and positive
influence on output




Public capital exerts a positive and








Total government expenditure has a
positive but statistically insignificant
effect on growth
Table 3.1: International studies on the Impact of Infrastructure Investment
1990). The most serious objections are related to the assumed causality between
public capital and output, the specication and restrictiveness of the estimated model
and the time-series characteristics of the data.
In addition to the production function approach a number of other approaches
have been utilized to investigate the impact of infrastructure on economic perfor-
mance. Examples of alternative approaches is the behavioural approach,73 cross-











section growth regressions74 and a class of models that examine the potential micro-
economic impact, postulated by the Barro (1990)-type models. Employing some of
these alternate models, Kessides (1993), Jimenez (1995), Munnell (1990), Murphy et
al (1989) and Amsden (1989) nd that infrastructure expenditure improves the pro-
ductivity of private capital, or reduces the cost structure of the private sector, rather
than the nal growth impact of infrastructure. Lee, Anas and Oh (1999) provide
empirical verication of this result.
The following issues need to be addressed when examining the impact of in-
frastructure development on growth. Firstly, the issue of the amount of services pro-
vided by the public capital stock needs to be investigated adequately. In all empirical
research it is implicitly assumed that these can be proxied by the stock of public cap-
ital or the level of government investment spending, which may not be true. For
instance, the amount of services provided is also determined by the efciency with
which services are provided from the stock of public capital. According to Munnell
(1993) there is substantial room for improving the efciency of infrastructure. Simi-
larly, the researcher must allow for network effects, whereby the quality of the con-
nections facilitated by infrastructure investments is separated from the level of the
to contain sufcient information. Furthermore, the issue of causality is also problematic. Most
studies following the behavioural approach conclude that public capital reduces private sector costs or
increases private sector prots. However, the estimated effects are generally signicantly smaller than
those reported by Aschauer (1989).
74 Problems associated with these cross-section regressions include biases due to omitted variables
and reverse causation. Conclusions based on cross-section regressions, especially in a cross-section of
heterogeneous countries, are often not very robust and this is also true for the outcomes with respect











public capital stock.75 It may also make quite a difference whether the investment
concerns infrastructure which previously did not exist at all, or simply an expan-
sion of already existing capital.76 Indeed, the evidence of Sturm, Jacobs and Groote
(1995)77 suggests that the former may be more important than the latter.78
Secondly, the concept of the stock of public capital includes rather diverging in-
gredients, like highways and streets, gas, water and electricity facilities. Most authors
employ data in their analyses which are usually chosen depending on the availabil-
ity of data without analyzing whether their conclusions are sensitive to the way the
capital stock has been constructed. For instance, most data on the capital stock are
constructed using the perpetual inventory method, in which assumptions about the
expected life of the assets are crucial. Few authors experiment with different den-
itions of the stock of public capital, which indeed, sometimes lead to diverging out-
comes (Sturm and de Haan, 1995; Garcia-Mil`a et al, 1996). Although some authors,
including Aschauer (1989), differentiate between the total stock of non-military pub-
lic capital and the stock of infrastructure, one may wonder whether this sufces. It is
likely that regions and industries react differently to various types of public capital.
Indeed, Pinnoi (1994) nds strong evidence in support of this view.
75 See for instance Garcia-Mil`a et al (1996).
76 For example, is the gain to the economy greater if a new two-lane road is built as oppossed to a
two-lane road turned into a four-lane road?
77 See also Sturm and de Haan (1995).
78 Even then, tarring a road when a gravel road would sufce given the climatic conditions and
utilization of the road, may not have much impact on the ease of transportation on this road. Thus
there is no denite answer to whether new infrastructure investment or simply an expansion of already











Furthermore, the time it takes for public capital to affect GVA growth may be
considerable. Thus, lag effects need to be incorporated into modelling infrastructure
development on economic activity.79
The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach tries to solve some of these issues.
An advantage of VAR models is that no a priori causality directions are imposed
or other identifying conditions derived from economic theory are needed. This study
will employ the Johansen Vector Error Correction (VECM) approach80 to estimate the
impact of social and economic infrastructure expenditure on per capita gross value-
added (GVA) for South Africa.81 The VECMmethodology allows for the indirect and
feedback effects of public capital on GVA to be accounted for by estimating a system
of simultaneous relationships.
A variety of studies on the impact of infrastructure expenditure on growth have
been conducted on South African data. One such study was instituted by the De-
velopment Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).82 Their report highlights three sets of
econometric results for South African data, all of which employ Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function specications. The DBSA's own study relates to the period 1967
1996, and controls for time and capacity utilization. The results indicate a strong,
positive relationship between public-sector capital and output, although the ordinary
79 Kamara (2007) uses Pool Mean Group Estimator and Generalized Method of Moments to account
for the lag effects and endogeneity arising from regressing the infrastructure measures on growth.
80 See Section 3.4.2 for a detailed description of this approach.
81 In this paper, the term gross value-added (GVA) will be used interchangeably with gross domestic
product (GDP).












least squares (OLS) estimates are spurious (elasticity of approximately 0.3). Using
Engle-Granger cointegration estimation, the DBSA study also nds strong crowding-
in effects of infrastructure on private-sector non-residential investment.83
Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) show that causality between infrastructure
investment and economic growth appears to run in both directions. Specically, they
nd a forcing relationship running from infrastructure xed capital stock to GVA
suggesting that infrastructure leads growth, though they also nd evidence of poten-
tial simultaneity between infrastructure and output (GVA and locomotives; GVA and
goods stock; goods vehicles and GVA; GVA and lectricity), of output leading in-
frastructure (GVA and railway lines; GVA and coaching stock; GVA and rail passen-
ger journeys; GVA and port cargo; GVA and SAA passengers; GVA and xed phone
lines), and of no association at all (GVA and rail carrying capacity; GVA and rail
freight; GVA and international air passengers). Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005)
nd weak evidence of feedback from output to infrastructure. In contrast, they nd a
strong evidence of infrastructure growth leading economic growth. Moreover, Fed-
derke and Bogetić (2008), using panel data for the SA manufacturing sector, nd
empirical links between infrastructure and productivity. Specically, infrastructure
affects output and total factor productivity directly.
Summarizing the literature, we come up with the following conclusions:
83 The results of the Engle-Granger estimation will also be biased if there exist more that one coin-
tegrating relationship. Given the presence of a bi-directional relationship between GDP and public
investment in the literature, it is likely that there exists at least two cointegrating vectors in a regres-











1. Public capital probably enhances economic growth; and
2. We are less certain about the magnitude of the effect and direction of association
between infrastructure and growth.
To provide an adequate examination of the South African evidence, given the
empirical literature and theoretical formulation of the relationship between the eco-
nomic growth and public infrastructure expenditure, the study ill answer ve salient
questions regarding the impact of economic and social infrastructure expenditure on
economic growth. They are:
1. Does there exist a legitimate association between economic growth and the
infrastructure measures? If so, is it positively or negatively related to GVA?
2. Is the impact of the infrastructure measures on output direct or indirect?
3. Is the relationship between the infrastructure measures and growth non-linear?
4. Which dimension of the infrastructure measures - economic or social - affects
economic growth in South Africa? If both affect per capita output growth, which
dimension has a more prominent effect?84
5. What is the direction of association between the infrastructure measures, output
and private investment?
84 The net impact of public infrastructure investment on private investment and per capita GDP will











Based on the literature, the impact of infrastructure on economic growth may be
affected by country-specic peculiarities. Therefore it is best to undertake this analy-
sis on a country-by-country basis because the various peculiarities of each economy
determine if public and private capital are complements or substitutes. We perform
this analysis on South African data.
3.3 Economic and Social Infrastructure: A Brief History
in SA
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) publishes the economic infrastructure
component of gross xed capital formation for general government and public cor-
porations. Examples of public corporations are Transnet (transport services such as
rail and air), Eskom (electricity), and Telkom (until its listing in March 2003; Telkom
provides telephone services). However, there has been a reclassication of these cor-
porations from general government to public corporations. Consequently, the analy-
sis which follows treats economic infrastructure of general government and public
corporations together under the expression `public sector'. While social infrastruc-
ture is dened by SA national accounts data as expenditure on infrastructure related
to education and health care, specically schools and hospitals. We use this data for
our analysis.
National accounts data reveals that government investment in infrastructure has











mation (GFCF) and GVA performance.85 This has been exacerbated by poor coher-
ence and coordination regarding economic infrastructure by the relevant government
departments. Figure 3.2 depicts per capita economic and social infrastructure invest-
ment. Both series demonstrate a long-term deterioration from the mid-1970s.
Source: South African Reserve Bank Bulletin
Figure 3.2: Economic and Social Infrastructure investment in per capita terms
Real gross investment in economic infrastructure per capita fell from R1,783.50
in 1976 to R531.55 in 2000, a collapse of approximately 70 percent. Investment rates
in gross economic infrastructure expenditure (for this period) fell from 8.81 percent
of GVA to 2.89 percent of GVA, which lies well below the international benchmark
of approximately three to six per cent identied by Kessides (1993). In 2002, 72% of











public-sector infrastructure investment consisted of transport, communication, power
and water. The recovery of infrastructure investment in the 1990s and the subsequent
slump were mainly the result of expansion programs by the telephone (Telkom) and
electricity (Eskom) utilities to extend telephone lines and electricity to areas which
were under-serviced, and the purchase of new aircraft by the national carrier (South
African Airways).86
Source: South African Reserve Bank Bulletin
Table 3.2: Economic infrastructure investment
Table 3.2 depicts the decline in infrastructure investment between the mid-
1970s and 2002 was part of an overall decline in gross xed capital formation (GFCF)
over the same period. The slowdown in infrastructure development between the mid-
1970s to 2002 was accompanied by a decline in the country's savings and total in-











vestment rates. Furthermore, the share of government consumption in the economy
grew.87 The South African government attempted to prop up the apartheid state in
the 1980s by increasing government consumption expenditure at the expense of in-
frastructure expenditure. The increase in government consumption expenditure in-
creases output while the infrastructure expenditure rate declined. Mariotti (2002)
states that government resources were redirected from investment to consumption in
the 1980s and early 1990s, whilst during from the latter half of the 1990s, scal con-
solidation to reduce the budget decit became a priority. The SA government cut
back on infrastructure expenditure between 1998-2002.88 In both cases, this had an
adverse impact on infrastructure expenditure.89
Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) provides an extensive data set of physi-
cal infrastructure developments in South Africa since 1875.90 The rst wave of in-
frastructure development was railways over the 18751930 period, after which there
was little change in the route - kilometre railway line distance  though rolling stock
continued to increase. The second wave in infrastructure investment was in inter-city
roads, which tapered off around 1940, after which the focus was on the paving of
national and provincial roads. In the 1920s and 1930s growth in road trafc far ex-
87 See Merrield (2000).
88 In the 80s the budget decit rises from an average of 2.9 percent between 1980 and 1986 to 4.9
percent in 1987 and 1994. Whilst post-1994, consumption and investment expenditure by government
is constrained to reduce budget decit. The result is a decline in the budget decit from an average of
4.5 percent between 1995 and 1998 to 1.8 percent between 1999 and 2003.
89 Falling infrastructure investment may also have been a response to overcapacity in certain areas.
This is explanation is supported by the ndings of Perkins et al (2005).
90 See Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) for a detailed discussion on the historical development of











ceeded growth in rail transport, and with the paving of roads after 1940 road trafc
continued to grow faster than rail for the rest of the century. While ports constitute
South Africa's oldest form of infrastructure, substantial expansion in port capacity
was limited to the 1970s. The nal phase of infrastructure development was in tele-
phones and electricity. While the average growth rate for xed phone lines dropped
in the 1960s, it rose again in response to the introduction of information and cell
phone technology.
A number of implications follow from the descriptive evidence. Firstly, South
Africa's stock of economic infrastructure has developed in stages  with a series of
sequential periods of infrastructure roll-out. Therefore, creating an index of physi-
cal infrastructure capital stock, may provide us with a more comprehensive picture
of the role economic infrastructure plays in development.91 We emphasize that nei-
ther increasing expenditure on infrastructure nor increasing the level of physical in-
frastructure implies there were improvements in infrastructure in the South Africa.
Apart from the national accounts data obtained from the SARB, the data set on
which our analysis is based was compiled largely from the statistical publications of
Statistics South Africa and its predecessors. Unfortunately the publication of most of
the time series relating to infrastructure (e.g. rail, roads, ports, air travel, telephones)
was discontinued by Statistics South Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s.92
91 This may be the reason why Perkins et al (2005) only nds some measures of physical infrastruc-
ture to have a positive effect over the anlaysed sample period.











Figure 3.3 portrays the index of capacity utilization of railroad and road in-
frastructure.93 The index incorporates different measures of rail infrastructure94 per
ton of freight and road infrastructure (both paved and unpaved) per vehicle. The
declining trend in this index may imply one of two things. Either infrastructure ca-
pacity is being eroded or infrastructure is being more intensively. In South Africa in
the early 1960s towards the 1970s, in response to rising GVA growth, the latter was
the case. Roads were being altered so that vehicular transportation could be more ef-
ciently utilized. Economic growth therefore appears to provide both the need for,
and the resources to fund, various types of infrastructure. It is plausible that phases
of infrastructure development took place both in response to changes in the structure
of the economy, while also impacting on economic performance in their own right.
Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) also nd that South Africa's economic in-
frastructure developed rapidly from the mid-1870s to the mid-1970s,95 but that this
was followed by a sharp slowdown from the late-1970s to 2002. The paper nds
a signicant long-run relationship between infrastructure and GVA in South Africa.
More specically, the results indicate that South Africa's GVA growth tends to drive
growth in individual measures of infrastructure-related goods and services. Interna-
tional evidence suggests that there is a strong correlation between xed investment
93 For the methodolgy used for the creation of the index of infrastructure see Appendix A.
94 Rail infrastructure measures include railway lines, locomotives and coaching stock.
95 The early boom in South Africa's infrastructure development was led by a need in the mining












Source: Perkins et al (2005)
Figure 3.3: Index Economic Infrastructure vs GVA per capital
and GVA growth. For example, countries such as Malaysia, South Korea and Chile
have kept GDI as a percentage of GVA at levels higher than 20% for the last two
decades and have experienced relatively strong and consistent growth.
Table 3.3 depicts a similar trend for social infrastructure expenditure in South
Africa. In particular, real social infrastructure expenditure per capita declines from
R388.08 in 1976 to R163.95 in 2000, representing a decline of approximately 60
percent. As a proportion of GVA, social infrastructure expenditure in 2004 was 1.06
percent of GVA. Figure 3.2 highlights an increase in social infrastructure expendi-
ture from the year 2000, with social infrastructure expenditure per capita rising to
R216.05 in 2004. This is in line with the government's renewed efforts to ensure











campaign to use its favourable scal position to generate social infrastructure, with a
special emphasis on the rural areas.
Source: South African Reserve Bank Bulletin
Table 3.3: Social infrastructure investment
Figure 3.4 highlights the decline in social infrastructure expenditure in the
1990s reected by physical infrastructure in schooling. The Figure displays a com-
posite index of new schools and classrooms built from 1995 to 2005.96 The im-
plication is that over the course of this period, fewer schools and classrooms have
been built. This reects the declining expenditure on social infrastructure depicted
in Table 3.3. The reason for this is twofold. Either the South African government
addressed South Africa's backlog in schools and classrooms over this period or the
government reduced schooling infrastructure expenditure. Given the current need for











Source: Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa
Figure 3.4: Composite Index of New Schools and Class Rooms
schools and classrooms in the rural areas of South Africa still exists, it is unlikely
that South Africa has met its requirement for new schools and classrooms.
The empirical evidence along with the literature highlighted above on both so-
cial and economic infrastructure expenditure in SA argues that the SA government
may have been spending mostly to cover depreciation of assets. Given the ndings of
literature on the link between infrastructure expenditure and growth, the responsive-
ness of government to the changing technological needs of the economy (with regard
to the type of infrastructure development) is crucial if it wishes to grow the econ-
omy from a transition to a developed economy. From ports, to railways, to roads,














The sample period covers annual data from 1970 to 2004.97 The variables employed
by this study to measure the two dimensions of infrastructure expenditure are the
economic and social infrastructure investment rate on real per capita GVA.98 Faced
with the need of ensuring an adequate representation of the economy in conjunction
with a parsimonious specication to render the Johansen estimation technique man-
ageable, we employ the conditioning explanatory variables displayed in Table 3.4 for
the estimation:
Variable Description Source
GVAP Log of Gross V alue Added per capita SARB
PRIV INR Log of Private Investment Rate SARB
SICR Log of Social Infrastructure Investment Rate SARB
EIR Log of Economic Infrastructure Investment Rate SARB
INSTAB Interest rate differential between US and SA SARB
PC Log of Price of Capital SARB
SAV R Log of the Savings Rate SARB
DEFGV A Deficit to GVA ratio SARB
CTR Log of Corporate Tax Rate National Treasury
SKR Log of skills ratio TIPS database
EconIndx Index of Econonomic Infrastructure Perkins et al (2005)
* Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat (TIPS)
Table 3.4: Data Description
97 At the outset, it should be stated that for the Johansen methodology the sample size is small. This
may be a shortcoming of the study but an unavoidable one because some of the variables we use in
the study are only available from 1970.
98 The data on investment in economic and social infrastructure includes expenditure by general











Our measure of the private investment rate (PRIV INR) is restricted to xed
capital stock strictly dened by the gross investment in the stock of machinery and
capital equipment as dened by the SARB. The investment rate is a crucial com-
ponent of any growth regression. It captures the rate of augmentation of physical
capital stock throughout the economy. Furthermore, to model the indirect impact of
the infrastructure expenditure on per capita output via the private investment rate, an
adequately specied investment equation is required.
A number of variables affect the investment rate in South Africa. For exam-
ple, Fedderke (2004) nds investment to be advers ly affected by uncertainty.99 The
presence of uncertainty is of concern to the investor due to the irreversibility of in-
vestment. We proxy for uncertainty using a the square of the long-term interest rate
differential between the US and SA (INSTAB).100 Fedderke (2004) uses a proxy to
measure the marginal cost of investment - the real user cost of capital. It includes the
price of capital of xed capital stock (PC)101 and the corporate tax rate (CTR). For
South Africa, the paper nds the real user cost of capital to have a negative effect on
the private investment rate.
99 See also Kularatne (2002) and Mariotti (2002) where political instability is found to have an ad-
verse effect on the private investment rate.
100 Using the interest rate differential between South Africa and US to proxy uncertainty is highly
correlated with the measure of political instability in South Africa constructed by Fedderke et al.
(2001). Furthermore, the interest rate differential measuring uncertainty generates peaks and troughs
that match historical developments in South Africa.
101 The price of capital includes the sum of the opportunity cost of xed capital stock (given by the in-
teraction of the real domestic short term interest rate and the investment deator) and the depreciation











Human capital is increasingly acknowledged as a necessary component of eco-
nomic growth. For example, Romer (1986, 1990) shows that human capital is needed
for the creation of knowledge-based goods. The ndings conclude that human capital
determines the rate of technological progress and, consequently, the long-run GDP
growth rate.102 Fedderke (2006) shows the quality of human capital has a positive ef-
fect on GVA in South Africa. Here we employ the skills ratio (SKR) to proxy for the
quality of human capital.
In addition, we argue that the savings rate (SAV R) does not have a direct ef-
fect on output nor private investment in South Africa. This follows the Kularatne
(2002) argument surrounding presence of credit rationing within the South African
economy. Credit rationing implies that private rms may nd it difcult to source
working capital from nancial intermediaries for investment projects. This nding is
supported by the World Bank Report (2000). The Report nds a signicant propor-
tion of large rms in South Africa nance 100 percent of their working capital from
retained earnings. However, rising savings rates allows the government to nance in-
frastructure expenditure by being able to borrow relatively cheaply. Therefore, we
hypothesize that rising savings rates should have a positive impact on economic in-
frastructure expenditure.
The evidence on the effect of government expenditure on growth is mixed.
Barro (1991) and Fischer (1993) found that government consumption expenditure












has a negative impact on economic growth. While Kormendi and Meguire (1985)
nd that the mean growth rate of the ratio of government spending to output has a
positive effect. Barro (1990) claims that government expenditure may have a positive
effect on GDP up to a certain level beyond which it will be negative. Since Mariotti
(2002) argues that government consumption to GDP threshold level in South Africa
has not been reached even at 12 percent of GDP, the possibility exists that government
consumption expenditure, at its current rates has a positive effect on GDP. We use the
budget decit ratio as proxy for government expenditure.
Univariate Time Series Characteristics of the Data
The univariate time series characteristics of the data are reported in Table 3.5.
Statistics are the augmented Dickey-Fullers. All the variables are found to be non-
stationary.103
The Johansen Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Vector Error
Correction Mechanism (VECM) cointegration technique will be applied. This es-
timation technique is well established in the literature, so the subsequent section will
only summarize this technique.
3.4.2 Johansen VECM Estimation Technique





















DEFGV A  2:38237  5:9271
indicates signicance at the 5% level
Table 3.5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics
Methodology
To estimate a structural model for the linkages between economic and social
infrastructure and other macroeconomic variables the Chapter employs the Johansen
estimation technique.104 This technique is based on estimating a Vector Error Correc-
tion Mechanism (VECM). The discussion of this methodology will be brief as this
technique is well established.
In the VECM framework, for which, in the case of a set of k variables, we may
have cointegrating relationships denoted r, such that 0  r  k   1. This gives us a
k dimensional VAR:
zt = Amzt 1 + :::+ Amzt m +  + t (3.13)
wherem denotes the lag length,  a set of deterministic components and  a Gaussian
error term.















 izt i +zt k+1 +  + t (3.14)
The existence of r cointegrating relationships amounts to the hypothesis that:
H1(r) :  = 
0 (3.15)
where  is pxp, and ,  are pxr matrices of full rank. H1(r) is thus the hypothesis
of reduced rank of . Where r > 1, issues of identication arise which requires the
use of economic restrictions on the loading matrix (), the matrix representing the
short run dynamics,  , and/or the cointegrating space, .105
Model
The empirical literature and theoretical model highlight the complex webs of
association between private, public capital and output. Infrastructure expenditure is
deemed to increase the growth potential of an economy by increasing the economy's
productive capacity by either affecting output directly, as additional factor of pro-
duction, or indirectly by increasing the productivity of private capital. Model [3.16]
incorporates the presence of both the indirect and feedback effects in the relation-
ship between the infrastructure measures- social and economic infrastructure, real
per capita GVA and the private investment rate based on the theoretical model.












From theory, we would expect r = 3 as there exists the possibility that while
economic infrastructure investment rate indirectly affects per capita output, feedback
effects are present from per capita output and private investment. This is supported
by Canning and Pedroni (2004) and the work of Perkins et al. (2005). The signs and
restrictions on the long run parameters are on the basis of a priori economic theory
discussed in Section 3.4.1.
We have no a priori evidence to zero restrict the effect of the price of capital










































While the estimates of the cointegrating vectors indicate the directions of asso-
ciation that maintain long run stationarity in each system, they offer no information











chastic trend. The size and sign of each error correction term (ECT), ij , represents
the direction and speed of adjustment of the system to its long run equilibrium after
a shock.
Furthermore, the error correction model will provide us with the relationship
between the rate of change in infrastructure investment rate variables and the per
capita GVA growth rate and describes the behaviour of the economy away from the
long run equilibrium growth path.
We rst test for the number of possible relationships in the model by establish-
ing the number of cointegrating vectors.
Johansen maximal and trace eigenvalue statistics
Table 3.6 reports the Johansen trace test statistics and their respective p-values
for the model.106 We observe the presence of three cointegrating vectors at the 10
percent signicance level. This indicates the possible existence of three equilibrium
relationships.
Null Tracestatistic p  value
r = 0 318:026 0:000
r = 1 224:047 0:006
r = 2 169:122 0:052
r = 3 127:901 0:117
* denotes signicance at 10%
Table 3.6: Johansen trace statistic











Johansen VECM Estimation Results
The three equilibrium relationships are estimated by means of the Johansen









































Table 3.7: Johansen results
Equations [1], [2] and [3] in Table 3.7 provide the three cointegrating relation-
ships for output per capita (GVAP), the private investment rate (PRIVINR) and the
economic infrastructure investment rate (EIR), respectively. The structural model of
the cointegrating relationships support some of our a priori expectations in Model
[3.16]. Unlike Model [3.16], we nd that the direct effect of the economic infrastruc-
ture investment rate and the savings rate on per capita output, the direct effect of
the corporate tax rate on the economic infrastructure investment rate and the direct
107 Note that one needs to pre-multiply all the coefcients in Table 3.7 by 1 so that the cointegrating











effect of the decit to GVA ratio for the private investment rate are all statistically
insignicant.108
As depicted in equilibrium relationship [1], rising private investment rates in-
creases per capita GVA by 0.89 percent. The determinants of private investment is
depicted in cointegrating vector [2]. The ndings of Fedderke (2004) are supported
by the equilibrium relationship [2] in that uncertainty (INSTAB), the price of capital
(PC) and the corporate tax rate (CTR) have a negative effect on the private invest-
ment rate. The fact that investment is irreversible results in uncertainty adversely
affecting both the private and economic infrastructure investment rate.109 Since gov-
ernment policy affects the corporate tax rate and the price of capital (by affecting the
interest rate), the nding supports the theory that imprudent government policy may
have an adverse effect on not only, the private investment rate but also the economic
infrastructure investment rate as depicted in the cointegrating vector [3].
There are also feedback effects from per capita output to private investment.110
This implies that rising levels of per capita GVA, indicate growing demand for goods
and services. This encourages greater investment.
Romer (1990) discusses the importance of human capital in the creation of
knowledge-based goods. These goods increase the growth rate of the economy.
Equation [1] supports this nding - a one percent increase in the skills ratio increases
108 Section 3.4.3 analyzes the net effect on the variables in the model to a shock to a particular variable.
109 See equilibrium relationship [3].











per capita output by 0.48 percent.111 Fedderke (2006) also nds a positive effect on
GDP in the quality of human capital for South Africa.
The direct, positive impact of rising savings rate on the economic infrastructure
investment rate conforms to our hypothesis in Section 3.4.1. The absence of a direct
effect of the savings rate on private investment supports Kularatne (2002) argument
of credit rationing within the South African economy.
Our estimation results suggest that both per capita output and the private in-
vestment rate have a positive effect on the economic infrastructure investment rate.
However, the economic infrastructure investment does not affect per capita output di-
rectly and has a negative, direct effect on the private investment rate. The latter con-
tradicts our hypothesis in Model [3.16]. A possible explanation for the contradiction
is that private investment may be `crowded out' by increases to public expenditure
on infrastructure. In this case, private and public capital may be substitutes.112
The relationships suggest that investment in economic infrastructure, in the
recent past, appears to be more a response to growth and rather than lead growth. As
capacity became more constrained with rising growth rates, SA appears to have been
faced with limited capacity in infrastructure. The SA government appears to have
responded by increasing the investment rate in economic infrastructure.
Social infrastructure on the other hand has a direct, positive effect on per capita
output. From cointegrating vector [1], a one percent increase in the social economic
111 Recall that the skills ratio is a proxy for the quality of human capital.











infrastructure results in a 0.28 percent increase in per capita output. A possible expla-
nation is that increasing expenditure on hospitals and schooling infrastructure would
provide a more productive labour force by improving the quality of the labour force.
Interestingly, increases to government expenditure relative to its revenue (mea-
sured by the decit to GVA ratio - DEFGVA) has a direct positive effect on per capita
output and the economic infrastructure investment rates. This suggests that increas-
ing government decit stimulates the economy by increasing aggregate demand.113
Impulse response analysis is necessary to determine the impact of a shock to
a particular variable on the other variables in the cointegrating system. This will
provide a more accurate picture of the net effect of a particular shock on the entire
system. Therefore in the following section we consider the reduced form coefcients
on particular variables for a set of specic shocks.
3.4.3 Impulse Response Analysis
The theoretical model in Section 3.2.1 suggests that increases in economic and social
infrastructure expenditure has a positive effect per capita GVA growth if the mar-
ginal product of capital for economic and/or social infrastructure is greater than their
respective marginal cost. Furthermore, the theoretical model highlights the possi-
bility of infrastructure expenditure indirectly affecting per capita output via private












investment. Therefore we analyze the net response of per capita output and private
investment rate to shocks to economic and social infrastructure investment rate.
Figure 3.5: Impulse Response: Shock to Economic and Social Infrastructure
Figure 3.5 portrays the effect of a one standard deviation shock to the eco-
nomic infrastructure investment rate.114 This shock causes an initial increase in the
economic infrastructure investment rate by 6.84 percentage points, stabilizing to 5.08
percentage points after 20 years. Social infrastructure investment expenditure also
increases by 5.45 percentage points. This suggests that expenditure on economic in-
114 See Canning et al. (2004) on performing impulse response analysis using a 1 standard deviation
shock is common in the economic literature when analysing empirical models. It provides one with a












frastructure such as roads are a prerequisite to social infrastructure such as schools
and hospitals.
However, while economic infrastructure expenditure increases GVA per capita
by 0.39 percentage points, it decreases the private investment rate by 3.10 percentage
points. A possible explanation for this is that economic infrastructure expenditure
may be crowding out private investment in South Africa.115 Kamara (2007) also nds
the presence of crowding out of private investment by public infrastructure invest-
ment for a panel of sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, a shock to the social
infrastructure investment rate also crowds out private investment. This is reected by
a decrease in the private investment rate by 2.29 percentage points. Figure 3.5 also
suggests that a positive shock to social infrastructure reduces economic infrastruc-
ture investment. For South Africa, rising expenditure on social infrastructure by the
government may imply less funds for expenditure on economic infrastructure.
Figure 3.5 provides evidence that a shock to the social infrastructure invest-
ment rate has no effect on per capita output. We offer two possible explanations for
this result. The rst is that crowding out effect on private investment due to a shock
to social infrastructure negates any positive effect of increasing social infrastructure
on GVA. The second possible explanation is that social infrastructure expenditure
in South Africa may be ineffectual. Although, on average, the social infrastructure
115 Recall Equation [2] in Model [3.16] shows that economic infrastructure investment rate has a











investment rate is 1.29 percent, the impulse response analysis suggests that this ex-
penditure has not produced a positive effect on per capita output.116
The suggestion given above for the negative response of the private investment
rate to shocks to economic and social infrastructure investment rate (in Figure 3.5) is
that infrastructure expenditure crowds out private investment. The crowding out the-
ory is supported for the South African data by Figure 3.6. The Figure shows that a
one standard deviation shock to the decit to GVA adversely affects the private in-
vestment rate and per capita GVA, reducing each by 0.59 percentage points and 0.03
percentage points, respectively. Figure 3.6 does portray positive effects on economic
and social infrastructure investment expenditure for a shock to the decit to GVA
ratio. The suggestion is that the South African government may be increasing the
budget decit to nance infrastructure expenditure.
Figure 3.6: Impulse response: Shock to Decit to GVA ratio
116 Given that South Africa's capital expenditure on education and health accounts for 15 percent of
total capital expenditure, the impulse response analysis implies that this expenditure has no effect on











In addition, Model [3.16] suggests the existence of feedback effects from per
capita output and private investment to economic infrastructure investment. The the-
oretical model also purports that increases in private capital stock increases the mar-
ginal productivity of economic and social infrastructure capital stock. Consequently,
increasing expenditure on economic and social infrastructure. This is supported by
the impulse response analysis depicted in Figure 3.7. The Figure depicts the feed-
back effect of shocks to per capita GVA and the private investment rate on economic
and social infrastructure investment rates. A shock to the private investment rate has
a greater effect on economic infrastructure investm nt rate than social infrastructure
investment rate. Specically, the economic infrastructure investment rate increases
by 8.67 percentage points while the social infrastructure investment rate increases
by only 3.29 percentage points. A possible explanation for this is that as private in-
vestment rises there is greater need for economic infrastructure (such as roads) by
the private businesses, more so than hospitals and schools. The need for economic
infrastructure by growing private rms is because these rms may need roads and
railroads to transfer their goods to market and reduce their logistic costs as they ex-
pand their market.
Figure 3.7 also shows that a one standard deviation shock to per capita GVA
results in a positive effect on private and public infrastructure investment rates. In
particular, a 1.25 percentage point increase, 2.93 percentage point increase and 2.58











and the private investment rate, respectively. This is in line with our theoretical prior
of increase in output increasing the marginal product of both public and private cap-
ital and thus investment both types of capital.
Figure 3.7: Impulse response: Shock GVA per capita and Private Investment
3.5 Conclusion
South Africa belongs to the group of transition countries. Such countries are gener-
ally in transition from developing to developed nations. Therefore the results of the
effect of economic and social infrastructure on the growth path experienced by SA
is an interesting one. Furthermore, the nature of the effect of economic and social











government can play in both stimulating and enabling a conducive environment for
such transition economies.
The ndings of the Chapter suggest that while expenditure on economic in-
frastructure has a positive effect on per capita output, social infrastructure expendi-
ture has no net output effects. The two possible reasons the Chapter proposes is that
either social infrastructure expenditure is ineffective or that the crowding out of pri-
vate investment by increases in social infrastructure investment negates any positive
effect of such spending on GDP. Economic infrastructure investment is also found to
crowd out private investment in South Africa. However, the feedback effects from
rising output and private investment to economic and social infrastructure are posi-
tive. This implies that as the economy grows, individuals demand more and better
roads, schools and hospitals.
We have shown the quantity of economic infrastructure has a positive effect on
per capita output. It remains to be explored how quality matters.117 Kamara (2007)
gives a lead.













Technology Shocks, Employment and
Labour Productivity
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 considers the importance of productive public expenditure in determin-
ing the developmental trajectory of transition economies in the long run. However,
economies experience short-term uctuations in GDP growth rate. The fundamental
framework to analyze economic uctuations is the Real Business Cycle (RBC) de-
veloped by Kydland and Prescott (1982). RBC models are developed under the as-
sumption of a competitive equilibrium in a neoclassical growth model framework,
augmented with a labour-leisure choice and exogenous technology shocks. This
model, developed to consider GDP uctuations in the US - a developed economy,
nds a high positive correlation between labour productivity118 and employment. The
source of that correlation lies at the root of the mechanism underlying macro uctu-
ations in these models: it reects the shift in the labour demand schedule caused by
technology shocks (and, to a less extent, the induced capital accumulation), com-
bined with an upward sloping (and less variable) labour supply.119
118 Throughout this Chapter the terms `labour productivity' and `productivity' will be used inter-
changeably.












This Chapter suggests that this traditional RBC framework for analyzing GDP
uctuations may not be valid for transition economies as these economies experience
a higher degree of imperfect competition and price rigidity. Moreover, since devel-
oped and transition economies may have quite different monetary policy objectives,
the response of the monetary authority in transition economies to shocks may vary
signicantly, affecting the variations in employment, labour productivity and output
in these economies. Thus monetary policy may inuence the dynamics of employ-
ment, labour productivity and output to shocks.
Given that different transition economies face different degrees of imperfect
competition, price rigidity and monetary policy objectives, we focus our analysis on
a specic country - South Africa (SA). South Africa, being a middle-income coun-
try, provides an excellent case study. SA has features of a developed and developing
economy. She has a well developed nancial sector120 with a developing manufactur-
ing sector that is faced with a high degree of imperfect competition.121
4.1.1 Motivation
Figure 4.1. displays the evolution of level and growth rate in output, employment
and labour productivity in South Africa from 1971q1   2006q4.122 The data is col-
120 See for instance Kularatne (2002).
121 See for instance Fedderke, Kularatne andMariotti (2007) and Aghion, Braun and Fedderke (2006).
122 The baseline series for labour productivity (X) was constructed by subtracting the log of employ-
ment (N ) from the log of GDP (Y ). The quarter-on-quarter growth rate in output (DY ), employment











lected from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA)123 and the South African Reserve Bank
Bulletin (SARB). Figure 4.1 reveals no discernible pattern of business cycles. Given
that a salient nding of the traditional RBC literature is a high positive correlation
between labour productivity and employment, we consider the correlation coefcient
between employment and labour productivity for South Africa. Table 4.1 compares
the correlation between employment, GDP and labour productivity in South Africa.
Sample: 1971q1-2006q4
Figure 4.1: Employment (N), output (Y) and labour productivity (X)
We discover the following:
1. Correlation coefcient between employment and labour productivity is
 statistically insignicant ( 0:16) for the entire sample;and
123 Only employment data is collected from StatsSA as the SARB employment series has an unex-























































 at 5% signicance;  at 10% signicance
Table 4.1: Unconditional correlation between growth rates of Y, N and X
 negative and statistically signicant for the period 1994q2  2006q4124 and
2000s;
2. Procyclical employment for the entire sample; and
3. Procyclical labour productivity for the entire sample.
From the preliminary evidence, point (1) is at odds with real business cycle
theory where a positive signicant correlation coefcient between employment and
labour productivity is to be expected. In particular, Table 4.1 indicates that pre-
1994q2, the correlation coefcient between productivity and employment was posi-
tive (though insignicant) whereas, in the post-democratization phase (post-1994q2),
this correlation became negative and signicant. This is contrary to standard RBC
theory.
124 The sample is dissected in 1994q2 because 1994 represents the year in which South Africa
underwent a democratic transition. It is also the period when more stringent (and some would argue)











Motivated by the evidence and given that the RBC model claims a positive cor-
relation between employment and labour productivity due to a technology shock, we
use a simple bivariate (employment and labour productivity) structural Vector Au-
toregression (VAR) model to decompose employment and labour productivity into
its technology and non-technology (demand) components. The identication of a
technology shock is performed by assuming that only technology shocks have a per-
manent effect on the level of labour productivity. This bivariate VAR model nds a
negative correlation between employment and productivity for a technology shock
and a positive correlation between these variables for a demand shock. The bivariate
VAR provides evidence that the South Afric n data does not conform to the tradi-
tional RBC nding.
This study seeks to identify a suitable model to explain the data. Any model
can be designed to correspond to the empirical data. The crucial requirement is that
the assumptions of the chosen model needs to represent the features of the economy
it is modelling.
Given that the South African manufacturing sector is faced with sticky prices,
high concentration ratios and imperfect competition reected by the prevalence of
high markups,125 we argue that a new-Keynesian business cycle model would be
more suited to explain the uctuations in output, employment and labour produc-
tivity in South Africa. We propose that the Gali (1999) is able to account for the











variations in these variables. The Gali (1999) model is a richer model than the bi-
variate model since it allows for the affect of a technology and/or demand shock on a
more representative model of the economy by including employment, output, labour
productivity, ination and real money balances in the model.
An alternative possibility for the negative comovement between labour and em-
ployment productivity may be explained by a lagged response of one of the variables.
This implies that the classical real business cycle model of Kydland and Prescott
(1982) may still hold true for the South African data. Given the ndings of high
markups, monopolistic competition and high concentration ratios in the South African
manufacturing industry by Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2007) and Fedderke
and Szolantai (2005), the Gali (1999) model appears to be an appropriate model to
use as the assumptions of the Gali model match some of the characteristics of South
African industry since classical real business cycle models assume perfect competi-
tion.
Institutional failure may also cause the negative comovement between labour
and employment productivity. However, this is is unlikely as South Africa has a
strong institutional structure that has grown in strength. For example, post-1994 the
independence of the South African Reserve Banks is a statutory requirement.
The Gali (1999) model provides the following economic interpretation for the
negative correlation between employment and output due to a technology shock. In











vidual producer) is determined by the level of aggregate real balances. With sluggish
price adjustment and limited monetary accommodation, the short-run response to a
positive technology shock is associated with little or no change in the real money
supply. Accordingly, the increase in aggregate demand (and desired output) will
fall short of the increase in multifactor productivity, inducing rms to decrease the
quantity of labour employed. Hence, technology shock will generate a negative cor-
relation between employment and productivity. Moreover, we nd that the degree
of monetary accommodation by the central bank affects the dynamics of employ-
ment and labour productivity. We suggest that the adoption of the ination targeting
regime in 2000 is change in the monetary policy regime and this may have affected
the response of employment and labour productivity to a technology shock.
On the other hand, the Gali (1999) model states that an increase in aggregate
demand and output arising from a monetary expansion will be partly met by higher
unobserved effort, in addition to higher `measured' employment. We nd that, if the
response of effort is large enough, an increase in labour productivity will ensue. In
that case monetary shocks will generate a positive comovement between employment
and productivity.
A nuance of this Chapter is that it analyses the possible values of the para-
meters in the model that generate specic variations in employment, output, labour
productivity, ination and real money balances in the data. We argue that this analy-











labour for South Africa. It also allows one to determine the inationary impact of a
demand and/or technology shock.
The structure of the Chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 analyses a bivariate
VAR model; Section 4.3 provides a description of the multivariate model together
with a theoretical analysis of the possible parameter values in the model; Section 4.4
provides an analysis of the link between the models parameters and monetary policy
in South Africa; Section 4.5 provides the impulse response of output, employment,
labour productivity, real money balances, the real interest rate and the ination rate
to a technology shock; and Section 4.6 summarizes the main conclusions.
4.2 A Two-Variable VAR analysis
4.2.1 Methodology
Gali (1999) decomposes employment and labour productivity into its technology and
non-technology components using a bivariate VAR analysis. The identication of
a technology shock is performed by assuming that only technology shocks have a
permanent effect on the level of labour productivity.126 Further, the two types of
shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to each other. Gali (1999) represents this idea
formally as follows.
126 Gali (1999) decomposition is unlike the Blanchard and Quah (1989) decomposition, where tech-











Let [xt;nt]0 be a vector representing the rst difference of labour produc-
tivity (xt) and employment (nt). Then we can represent this vector as a distributed

















where "zt and "mt represent technology and non-technology shocks over time.127 As-
suming only technology shocks have a permanent effect on output, we imposeC12(1) =
0.
Estimates of the C(L) matrix is obtained from a reduced-form VAR represen-
tation of [xt;nt]0.128 They are then used to formulate estimates of conditional
correlations from the following formula:
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where i = z;m . The conditional variances of productivity and employment growth
are ^
2





















The above formulation requires labour productivity and employment to be non-
stationary. Table 4.2 conrms employment and labour productivity are nonstationary
series for the South African data for the period 1971q1  2006q4.
127 To differentiate the technology and non-technology shocks from one another, Gali (1999) assumes
that they are orthogonal to one another, i.e., E"zt "mt = 0.














* denotes rejections of the null of a unit root at the 95% critical value
Table 4.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics
4.2.2 Graphical Representation of the Bivariate Decomposition
Panels 1 and 2 in Figure 4.2 display disaggregated employment and output into its
technology and non-technology components.129 From Panel 1 in Figure 4.2. We
observe that although the comovements of the technology components of GDP and
employment are not negligible, the patterns displayed by the two series hardly coin-
cide with recognizable business cycles in South Africa. The positive comovement
of GDP and employment, with respect to its technology components (which is gener-
ally viewed as central characteristic of business cycles), seems hardly present. How-
ever, when considering the non-technology components of output and employment,
recognizable business cycles are visible.
Considering the growth rates in labour productivity and employment for the
sample, Panel 1 in Figure 4.3 shows (once again) that no distinct relationship is vis-
ible between employment and labour productivity growth. Further, from Figure 4.3
the following is clearly noticeable:
 Negative relationship between labour productivity and employment growth
when comparing the technology components of the two variables (Panel 2);
and











 Positive relationship between labour productivity and employment growth
when comparing the demand components of the two variables (Panel 3).
Figure 4.2: Growth rate in Y and N by its demand and technology components
4.2.3 Conditional correlation
Using the constructed bivariate VAR model, Table 4.3 considers the unconditional
and conditional correlation130 coefcients between labour productivity and employ-
ment growth rates calculated using Equation 4.2. We observe, for the period 1971q1 
2006q4, the conditional correlation between employment and labour productivity is
negative for a technology shock and positive for a demand shock. Furthermore,












Figure 4.3: Productivity-Employment: Demand and technology components
the conditional correlation between employment and labour productivity for tech-
nology and demand shock is positive for the period 1971q1   1994q1 and negative
for 1994q2  2006q4. This result indicates that the dynamics of employment and/or
labour productivity in response to demand and technology shocks may have altered
in South Africa over the period. One of the possible reasons for this difference is a
change in the structural parameters underlying the South African economy. There
are many possible reasons for the change in the structural parameters.131




































 at 5% signicance
Table 4.3: Employment-labour Productivity Correlations
This preliminary analysis on the basis of the bivariate VAR model on the South
African business cycle indicates that RBC theory is unable to adequately account for
trends in employment and labour productivity in South Africa. This implies that one
(or more) of the assumptions of RBC models must be violated.
The question arises: What is the characteristic of middle-income transition
economies (and other economies which display this relationship between labour pro-
ductivity and employment) that RBC models do not take account of?
A stylized fact regarding transition economies is that they typically lack a suf-
ciently large market size which might allow them to exploit the economies of scale











of opening their economies and therefore unable to acquire the benets of a larger
world market.132 Thus transition economies face less competitive pressure than de-
veloped economies. For example, the South African manufacturing industry has been
plagued by high markups approximately twice as large as the US.133 High markups
in SA manufacturing arise from high concentration ratios and monopolistic prac-
tices.134 All this evidence indicates that the degree of imperfect competition in the
South African manufacturing industry is higher than the US. Standard real business
cycle models assume perfect competition and therefore do not acknowledge the pos-
sibility of markups and their effect on business cycl dynamics. Thus the importance
of sticky prices is overlooked by standard real business cycle literature.
Standard real business cycle theory demand (non-technology) shocks generate
negative comovement between employment and labour productivity.135 For the South
African data, we have shown a positive comovement between employment and labour
productivity in response to a demand shock. One possible reason is that the returns
to labour inuence a rms hiring decisions when faced with a demand shock.136 This
indicates that the returns to labour in transition economies may differ signicantly
from developed economies due to differences in skill level and structure of the labour
132 See for instance Ricci et al (2008) state that the share of world trade for emerging countries rose
by 27 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in 2004.
133 See Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2007).
134 See for instance Aghion, Braun Fedderke (2006) and Fedderke and Szalontai (2005) on the preva-
lence of high concentration ratios in the South African manufacturing industry.
135 See for instance Hansen and Wright (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). The latter
argue,for the classical RBC model, demand shocks would shift the labour supply curve and generate
the desired negative correlation between employment and labour productivity.











force. Consequently, this will have an effect on employment dynamics in response to
shocks. Standard real business cycle literature fail to consider the impact of returns
to labour.
The empirical evidence and structure of the South African economy suggest
that the evidence seems to be at odds with the assumptions of standard RBC models,
while being consistent with new-Keynesian models characterized by monopolistic
competition, sticky prices, and variable effort. In the face of monopolistic competi-
tion and sticky prices, the implications for ination, real money balances, real inter-
est rate together with employment, output and labour productivity due to technology
and demand shocks are more complex and may differ considerably from standard
real business cycle literature. Therefore, a simple bivariate VAR decomposition is
inadequate to capture all these complexities.
The theoretical model we adopt should incorporate the effects of both these
types of shocks on these variables and investigate the extent to which monetary ac-
commodation, the degree of price stickiness in the product market, the magnitude of
the markup and returns to labour affect the economy's response to technology and
non-technology shocks. We propose that in the next section that the Gali (1999)
new-Keynesian business cycle model does exactly this. We discuss this model in the
following section and apply it to the South African data by estimating a ve-variable











der which certain observed behaviour between output, employment, labour produc-
tivity and prices are plausible when we account for demand and technology shocks.
4.3 A Multivariate Model: Theoretical Analysis
The model developed by Gali (1999) is a general equilibrium monetary model with
sticky prices and unobserved variations in labour effort. The model assumes shocks
emanate from two possible sources: technology and monetary shocks. Nominal price
rigidities are introduced by assuming that rms have to set their prices before shocks
are realized. The model also allows for monetary accommodation, i.e., the monetary
authority may respond in a systematic fashion to technology shocks. Such a policy is
feasible if the government wishes to stabilize prices, output and/or employment. Thus
money supply in the model can either be exogenous or endogenous in the model.
4.3.1 Setup
The setup of the model is as follows:
A. Household's problem












subject to the budget constraint:Z 1
0











for t = 0; 1; :::. M and t represent nominal money holdings and prots while H is
the disutility form work which is a function of hours (N ) and effort (U ) dened as







W and V denote the prices of an hour of work and a unit of effort, respectively whilst
 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. n; u; n and u are positive constants. Effort
measures the quality of hours worked. Hours worked together with effort represent
the effective labour used by the each rm. Thus, using this formulation, both the
quantity and the quality of labour matter in the production of output.




















whereCit is the quantity of good i consumed in period t and  > 1 represents the con-















































An interpretation of the FONCs is as follows. FONC (4.8) indicates that each
household decides how much to consume (Ct) given the aggregate price (Pt) at each






. The intertemporal optimality condition (4.9) provides the expected
discounted return that must hold if the household forgoes one unit of consumption
at time t. Thus the trade-off between present and future consumption depends on





, and the util-
ity gained in time period t from holding more real money balances as consumption
is forgone. The two intratemporal optimality conditions state that the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and hours worked (4.10), or between consump-
tion and effort (4.11), equals the real hourly wage rate and real `payment' for effort,
respectively.
B. Firm's problem
















There is a continuum of rms distributed uniformly on the unit interval. Each
rm is indexed by i 2 [0; 1], and produces a differentiated good. The production










where  2 (0; 1). Z is a measure of aggregate technology whose growth rate t 
iid N(0; s2z), where






















The rm i sets price Pit (price at which it will sell good i at date t) at the end
of period t  1, given aggregate price Pt. Once Vt andWt are realized given the state
138 The rst budget constraint (4.16) is the solution to the rms cost minimization problem by rm,
i.e., assume rm chooses Nit and Uit, givenWt and Vt, once uncertainty is realized.
The second budget constraint (4.17) is from the fact that it is optimal for each rm i to satisfy the











of the world (which is dependent on the shock) in period t, the rm chooses Nit and
Uit.139
The FONC is:
Et 1f(1=Ct) [PitYit   WtNit] g = 0 (4.18)
where  = "
" 1 > 1 is the associated markup set by rm i.






=(M arg inal product of hours worked) (4.19)
Thus we can dene the price of good i at time t (Pit) as:
Pit=( W t) = (M arg inal product of hours worked) (4.20)
For South Africa, Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2007), using the Solow
residual to calculate markup, nd the markup for SA manufacturing is approximately
twice as large as the US. This implies that the degree of monopolistic competition
is much higher in South Africa than it is in the US. Aghion, Braun and Fedderke
(2006) argue that higher past mark ups in SA manufacturing are associated with
lower current productivity growth rates and lower current employment.. This has
implications for the behaviour of the economy to technology and non-technology
shocks.140
C. Money supply
139 It is assumed that the rm can observe effort.
140 Note Roeger (1995), and Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) show that with  > 1, we overes-















where t  iid N(0; s2m) and orthogonal to the sequence of technology shocks ftg
at all leads and lags. The model allows for the central bank to respond to technology







Denition 1 Given the households initial nominal money holdings (M s0 ) and the
stochastic processes fM st g and fZtg, a symmetric equilibrium (where each rm i
charges the same price Pt) is an allocation, fCt; N t; U t; Y t;tg
1
t=0, price system,
fPt;W t; V tg and government policy parameter () such that:
 fCt; N t; U t;t;M stg solves the household's problem (4.3) subject to the
sequence of budget constraints (4.4);
 fPt; Y t; N t; U tg solves the rm's problem (4.15) subject to (4.16) and (4.17)
with fYt; Nt; Utg being demand determined.
 equilibrium in the money market implies that:
Mt
Mt 1
=exp(t+t) for all t




























 output market clears such that:
Yt = AZtN
'











represents the velocity of circulation of

























indicating that a higher
relative price for good i reduces relative consumption. It also implies that an
increase in real money balances results in an increase in relative price.143
4.3.2 Model Dynamics
142  represents the velocity of circulation of money which is constant as a consequence of the iid
assumption on growth rate of money. Gali (1999) assumes that the velocity of circulation money






143 It can be shown the indirect utility function for this model exhibits constant marginal utility of













Gali (1999) obtains a set of expressions for the equilibrium levels144 of prices
(pt), output (yt), employment (nt), and labour productivity (xt)145 in terms of the
exogenous driving variables - monetary (t) and technology (t) shocks:
pt = t 1 (1  )t 1 (4.24)

























The model depicts how an unanticipated monetary shock (t > 0) has a tran-
sitory impact on output (4.25), employment (4.26) and labour productivity (4.27).146
However, from (4.24) we observe that a change in the level of nominal money bal-
ances changes the ination rate and thus permanently, and proportionately, affects
the price level, with a one period lag.147 Moreover, in response to an unanticipated
monetary expansion, output and employment unambiguously rise, reverting back to
144 Letters in lower case depict natural logarithm of each variable.
145 Recall that labour productivity is the log difference between output and employment (hours) be-
tween x = y   n.
146 The model results indicate that money is non-neutral in the short-run.
147 The lagged effect of price level to a monetary expansion is due to the prevalence of sticky prices
in the model. Woodford (2000) nds a similar result where monetary shocks only permanently affect











their original level after one period.148 Kularatne (2007) shows the converse holds for
a contractionary monetary shock occurring in the South African economy.
The model displays a temporary positive effect on labour productivity based on
an unanticipated monetary expansion if there exists short-run increasing returns to
labour (SRIRL), i.e., ' > 1.149 For SRIRL to hold the following are required:
1. A sufciently `productive' effort (i.e., low );
2. A sufciently low elasticity of effort's marginal disutility relative to that of
employment (i.e., u n); and/or
3. A sufciently high elasticity of output with respect to effective labour input,
(i.e., high ).
The above imply that there are high returns (i.e., high ) to the rm from em-
ploying extra labour (N rising) as they are relatively productive (i.e.,   ! 0) and
that workers are willing to work longer hours if the disutility arising from putting
more effort is relatively much less than the disutility from working longer hours as
the tendency for workers to shirk then is much less (i.e., u
n
 ! 0). Thus SRIRL
imply that labour productivity will rise in response to a monetary expansion together
with rising employment (although both effects are temporary). In contrast, an in-





> 0 for the assumed parameter values of , , n and u.
149 From (4.22) we see that when ' > 1, the marginal product of hours increases at an increasing
rate. If the economy experiences constant short-run returns to labour (' = 1), a demand shock has no











crease in aggregate demand and output arising from a monetary expansion will be
partly met by higher unobserved effort, in addition to higher measured employ-
ment.150 If the response of effort is large enough, an increase in labour productivity
will ensue. In that case, monetary shocks will generate a positive comovement be-
tween employment and labour productivity.
The model purports that the effects of a positive technology shock (t > 0) has
a permanent, one-for-one effect on output (4.25) and labour productivity (4.27). The
same shock will have a (permanent) negative effect on the price level (4.24) if the
degree of monetary accommodation is not too strong (i.e.,  < 1). Moreover, if the
latter holds, then a positive technology shock will have a negative, though transitory,
effect on the level of employment.151
The reasoning for this is as follows: Consider, the case of constant exogenous
money supply ( = 0).152 Then the combination of a constant money supply and pre-
determined prices implies (from equilibrium condition (4.22)) that real balances (and,
thus, aggregate demand) remain unchanged in the period when the technology shock






each rm will thus meet its demand by producing the same level of output Yt. Thus
each rm will require less less labour input (Nt), and a decline in employment will
150 This result is true if and only if the substitution effect outweighs the income effect such that labour
nds it more benecial to subsitute work for leisure. See Hansen and Wright (1992) regarding labour
market predictions of the RBC models.
151 That is if t > 0 and  < 1, thennt < 0.
152 Gali (1999) shows it applies to the case when there exists an endogenous monetary response. The












be observed (N < 0).153 In addition, unchanged output and lower employment
will lead to an unambiguous increase in labour productivity in response to the same
shock. In the following period, rms adjust their prices downward (since marginal
cost is lower from Equation (4.20)), aggregate demand and output will go up as real
money holdings rise. Thus employment returns to its original level. The sign of the
associated change in labour productivity depends again on whether the change in out-
put is more or less than proportional to the change in employment, which, in turn,
determines whether the immediate response of labour productivity to a technology
shock overshoots. Overshooting occurs given the following conditions are satised:
Overshooting of productivity ()




Table 4.4 shows that the qualitative effects on employment, prices, output and
labour productivity due to a technology shock will remain unchanged even when
there exists some monetary accommodation, i.e.,  2 [0; 1). If the monetary author-
ity decide to lessen the initial adverse impact on employment of a positive technology
shock, ( > 1), the choice of the monetary policy rule will only have a permanent
effect on prices, but it will affect the size and/or the dynamic pattern of the responses
of output, employment and labour productivity. In particular, Gali (1999) notes that
the monetary authority will face a trade off between employment and price volatil-
153 This decline in employment is depicted in other models that do not assume sticky prices. See
Rotemberg (1996), King and Wolman (1996) and Calvo (1983), Hairault, Langot and Portier (1995),
and Cooley and Dwyer (1995). Some of these models assume a positive technology shock induces a
small rightward shift in labor demand, which is more than offset by a relatively larger leftward shift
in labor supply indicating that the wealth effects may dominate the substitution effects. The latter is











ity and the magnitude of unanticipated output change will also be erratic. Siu (2004)
states that with sticky prices, a benevolent government must balance the shock ab-
sorbing benets of state-contingent ination against its resource misallocation costs.
RESPONSE OF PRICES, OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT & PRODUCTIVITY
'=+(1 )( 1+n1+u )  pt yt nt xt
t 1 t t 1 t t t 1
0<'<1 2[0;1) <0 >0 >0 <0 >0 <0
=1 =0 >0 =0 =0 >0 =0
>1 >0 >0 <0 >0 >0() '>  1
<0() '<  1
>0
'=1 2[0;1) <0 >0 >0 <0 >0 =0
=1 =0 >0 =0 =0 >0 =0
>1 >0 >0 <0 >0 >0 =0
'>1 2[0;1) <0 >0 >0 <0 >0 >0
=1 =0 >0 =0 =0 >0 =0
>1 >0 >0 <0 >0 >0 <0
 indicates overshooting
Table 4.4: Response to a technology shock
Analysis of covariances
Gali (1999) nds the unconditional covariances for output, employment and










2 ('  1) s2m
'2
(4.30)














Firstly, from (4.29) irrespective of the degree of accommodation of monetary
policy (i.e., the value of ), SRIRL (' > 1) is a sufcient condition for labour pro-
ductivity to be procyclical, independent of the relative importance of the two shocks,
s2m and s2z.







if exogenous monetary shocks are a sufciently important source of uctuations rel-
ative to technology shocks (i.e., s2m  s2z), then employment growth should be pro-
cyclical.154
Focusing attention on the sign of the comovement between employment and
labour productivity growth, (4.30)shows that with some short-run increasing returns
to labour, ' 2 (1; 2), and a not too strong endogenous monetary response,  2 [0; 1),
the unconditional comovements between labour productivity and employment are
positive and thus follows RBC theory. Thus, the magnitude of the SRIRL (size of
'), the extent of monetary accommodation (the policy parameter ), and the rela-
tive importance of shocks (s2m versus s2z) determines the unconditional comovements
between labour productivity and employment.
However, when considering the conditional covariances (conditioning on the
nature of the shock - technology or monetary) we have the following:
cov(nt;xt j m) =
2 ('  1) s2m
'2
(4.31)
cov(nt;xt j z) =  
(1  ) [(2  ')+2 ('  1)] s2z
'2
(4.32)
154 From Table 4.1, the South African data for this sample indicates a statistically signicant correla-











However, under the same assumptions ( 2 [0; 1) and ' 2 (1; 2)), the two
Equations - (4.31) and (4.32) - imply conditional comovements between employ-
ment and labour productivity growth are of opposite signs. That is, conditional on
positive monetary (demand) shocks being the source of uctuations, the sticky price
model predicts a positive correlation between employment and labour productivity
growth.155 In contrast, a positive technology shocks generates negative correlation
between employment and labour productivity growth. Figure 4.4, provides condi-
tions under which, for a positive technology shock, we may expect to the covariance
between employment and labour productivity positive and negative, respectively.
From Figure 4.4 we conclude the following:





<  < 1

\ (' > 0)) cov(nt;xt j z) < 0 (4.34)
If ( > 1) \ (cov(nt;xtjz) < 0)) ' < 1 (4.35)
From (4.35), when the monetary authorities follow an accommodative mone-
tary policy, it is still possible to have negative comovement in labour productivity and
employment growth due to a technology shock if the economy experiences short-run
decreasing returns to labour, (' < 1). Further, (4.34) indicates that irrespective of the
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Figure 4.4: Technology Shock: Employment and Productivity
a technology shock will generate negative comovement between employment and
labour productivity. Moreover, from (4.33), it is only possible to generate the classi-
cal RBC result of positive comovement between employment and labour productivity
when money supply is exogenous ( = 0) if there are sufciently large short-run in-
creasing returns to labour (' > 2).
These predictions are in contrast with the prediction of standard RBC mod-
els where, technology shocks are a source of a positive comovement between em-
ployment and labour productivity, while non-technology shocks generate a negative
comovement.156 Therefore, the two classes of models have very different implica-











tions regarding the responses of employment and labour productivity to each type of
shock. The exact dynamics of the model depend on the value of the returns to labour
(') and monetary policy response () parameters.
Summary
The main conclusions of this model are:
1. Technology shocks will generate a negative comovement between the
employment and labour productivity variables157 while the opposite will is true
arising from demand shocks. The economic reasoning is as follows: The model
is constructed such that in equilibrium, aggregate demand is determined by
the level of aggregate real money balances. This implies that with sticky price
adjustment and limited monetary accommodation, the short-run response to
a positive technology shock is associated with little or no change in the real
money supply. Thus the increase in aggregate demand (and desired output)
will be unable to meet the increase in multifactor labour productivity due to a
positive technology shock. This induces rms to decrease output and hence the
quantity of labour employed. The result: a technology shock will generate a
negative correlation between employment and labour productivity.
2. An increase in aggregate demand and output arising from a monetary expansion
will be partly met by higher unobserved effort, in addition to higher measured











employment.158 If the response of effort is large enough, an increase in labour
productivity will ensue. In that case monetary shocks will generate a positive
comovement between employment and labour productivity.
4.4 The Relationship between Policy Parameters and
Monetary Policy in South Africa
For example, recall from Table 4.3 for the period 1971q1   1994q1,the conditional
correlation between employment and labour productivity in response to a technology
shock is positive.159 There may exist three possibilities for this result:
1. The South African economy pre-1994 may have followed standard RBC theory
in its response to technology shocks. This implies relatively exible prices so
that a rise in output due to a technology shock is matched by a fall in prices (in
the same period). This increases aggregate demand and rms increase output to
meet that demand by hiring more workers. Furthermore, since marginal product
of labour increases with the technology shock, rms hire more workers and
employment rises;160
158 This result is true if and only if the substitution effect outweighs the income effect such that
labour nds it more benecial to subsitute work for leisure. See for instance Hansen and Wright
(1992) regarding labour market predictions of the RBC models.
159 The conditional correlation coeccient is statistically insignicant. The signicance test may not
have enough power due to lack of sufcient obervations for this subsample. Bootstrapping to obtain
the correct standard error will provide a more accurate test of signicance.












2. The second possibility is that South African economy does operate in an
environment of sticky prices between 1971q1   1994q1 with the monetary
authority in South Africa responding aggressively to technology shocks by
instituting expansionary monetary policy ( > 1). The policy makers are able
to negate the the possible decrease in employment due to a technology shock by
adhering to this monetary policy rule. When  > 1, Equation 4.32 is positive.161
3. The third possibility (based on Equation (4.32)) is that the South African
economy operating in an environment of sticky prices between 1971q1 1994q1
with the monetary authority following an exogenous money supply rule or
with very little intervention in the economy in response to monetary shocks 
0 6  < 1
2

and with the economy experiencing relatively high SRIRL
(' > 2).
From research conducted on mark-ups and monopolistic competition in South
Africa by Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2007) and Aghion, Braun and Fedderke
(2006) we conclude that the rst explanation on the probable cause of the positive
correlation between labour productivity and employment is unlikely to be the case. It
is more likely that prices continue to be sticky from 1971q1 1994q1 due to monopo-
listic behaviour and the monetary authority aggressively engaged in an accomodative
161 This result is contingent on the magnitude of the returns to labour ('). If the economy experiences
constant or increasing returns to labour then this result will hold. Under decreasing returns to labour,











monetary policy to smooth out any shocks the economy may have experienced.162
Moreover, Aaron and Muellbauer (2007) show that increased openness of the South
African economy, fostered greater competition and therefore reduced mark-ups post
1994.
Moreover, Table 4.3 highlights the unconditional and conditional correlation
(conditional on either a technology or non-technology shock) between employment
and labour productivity are negative for the sub-sample 1994q2  2006q4. The neg-
ative conditional correlation (conditional on the technology shock) implies the pres-
ence of sticky prices and a less aggressive monetary policy regime. Indeed, from the
year 2000, a policy of ination targeting was implemented by the Reserve Bank. By
doing so, the Bank's only responsibility is to keep the ination rate within the tar-
get range of 3 to 6 percent. To gain credibility, the Bank was not allowed (by law) to
engage in contractionary or expansionary monetary policy in order to either dampen
or stimulate the economy. This change in the policy stance of the Reserve Bank im-
plies that it began to lessen its monetary accommodation ( t 0 < 1), to counter any
adverse effects on employment that technology shocks may trigger. On the basis of
Equation (4.31), conditional on a demand shock, the negative correlation163 between
employment and labour productivity for the sub-sample 1994q2   2006q4 may be
due to the presence of decreasing short-run returns to labour (' < 1).164
162 Further investigation needs to be conducted to determine if ( > 1) or  2 [0; 12 ) and (' > 2).
163 Once again it is statistically insignicant and thus bootstrapping may be required to obtain an
accurate standard error for the correlaton coefcient.











We now use the multivariate model to analyze the impact of a technology shock
on a set of macroeconomic variables using South African data.
4.5 A Multivariate Model: Impulse Response Analysis
4.5.1 Methodology
These set of macroeconomic variables we consider using the South African data are
chosen as specied by the theoretical model. They are the growth rates of labour
productivity (x), employment (n), real money balances (m p), ination
rate (2p) and real interest rate (r  2p) for the period 1971q1   2006q4. Real
interest rates are included as the monetary authority may affect the economy either
by affecting the money supply directly or indirectly via the nominal interest rate.
The stock of money is measured by M3 money balances, ination by CPIX and we
use the repo rate as a measure of interest rates to analyze the response of policy to
technology shocks.
We analyze the effect of technology shocks on these macroeconomic variables
by using an extension of the VAR decomposition described by Equation 4.1. An
The question the arises: What exactly is ' measuring? Does it measure "returns to labour" only?
Given the study conducted on markups in the SA manufacturing sector, Fedderke Kularatne and Mar-
iotti (2006) and Aghion and Fedderke (2007) nd that the markup is twice that of the US. This implies
that the '  parameter includes not only a measure of returns to labour but also the markup in the SA
manufacturing sector. It also implies that, given the results of Tables 4.4, the markup does affect the
response of output, employment and labour productivity to demand and technology shocks through



















where estimates of theC(L) 55matrix is obtained from a reduced-form VAR repre-
sentation of [x;n;m p;r 2p;2p]0 and "t = ["zt ; "m1t ; "m2t ; "m3t ; "m4t ]0.
Once again, in order to identify the technology shock f"ztg we assume that
technology shocks are orthogonal to demand shocks f"m1t ; "m2t ; "m3t ; "m4t g and have
a permanent effect on labour productivity, i.e., E"zt ; "
mj
t = 0 and C1j(1) = 0 for
j = 2; 3; 4; 5.165
This analysis requires the level of labour productivity, employment, real money
balances and the ination rate to be integrated of order 1 (I  (1)). Table 4.5 con-
rms this to be true for the South African data for the period 1971q1 2006q4. Thus
[x;n;m p;r  2p;2p] are stationary at the 5% signicance level.166
Furthermore, we use a VAR with 4 lags to obtain estimates of the C(L)matrix.
This VAR model provides a more comprehensive description of the economy vis-à-
vis the simple bivariate decomposition discussed in Section 4.2.
165 Gali (1999) cautions one from identifying the possible demand shocks since it would require one
to impose contoversial restrictions on the model. Therefore in this study we do not attempt to identify
the various demand shocks.
166 Note that its is the change in the ination rate (2p) and the change in the real interest rate (r 
2p). This result implies that the real interest rate is nonstationary implying that the Fischer Equation
does not hold for South Africa. Fedderke and Pillay (2007) argue that Fisher Equation only holds for

















* denotes rejections of the null of a unit root at the 95% critical value
Table 4.5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics
4.5.2 Results
The simulation of the response of employment, output, labour productivity, real
money balances, real interest rate and the ination rate to a technology shock are
constructed using Model [4.36]. The behaviour of the these variables to a technol-
ogy shock will be analyzed with respect to hypotheses suggested in Table 4.4. Given
the fact the bivariate analysis in Section 4.2.3 illustrates the fact the response of em-
ployment and labour productivity differs between the subsamples, we examine the
response of the ve variables for the different sub-samples as well.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the impulse response to a positive one standard deviation
technology shock. Estimating over the entire sample period, a positive technology
shock leads to an immediate increase in labour productivity of 0.56 percent that is not
matched by a proportional change in output (the latter's response building up more
slowly over time) of approximately 0.5 percent and a transitory decline in employ-
ment of 0.1 percent. The gap between the initial increase in labour productivity and
the (smaller) increase in output is reected in a short-lived decline in employment.











labour productivity due to a technology shock. Moreover, in response to the tech-
nology shock, labour productivity stabilizes at 1.12 percent higher while output rises
by 1.20 percent after 12 quarters. This is reected by a marginal rise in employment
rises of 0.025 percent 3 years after the shock.
Recapping the economic reasoning for this phenomenon:167 With a technology
shock, labour productivity increases, marginal cost declines and prices fall resulting
in falling ination, with a lag due to sticky prices. Falling prices results in a rise on
real money holdings which increases demand. This increases output and employ-
ment and prices begin to rise once again. The gradual rise in real money holding is
due to an initial decline in the price level and moderate money growth due to ris-
ing demand. Furthermore, the rise in the gap between real money holdings and real
output (m  p  y) indicates a rising velocity of circulation of money which is con-
sistent with the observed decline in the nominal interest rate. In the long run, the real
interest rate is higher, consistent with the higher marginal productivity of capital due
to the technological shock.
Figure 4.6, depicts the impulse response for the sample 1971q1  1994q1. The
response of to a technology shock is a marginal increase in employment. The ar-
gument for this is that a highly accommodative monetary policy stance during this
period was followed by the monetary authority. This is reected in a rise in the ina-
tion rate even though a technology shock occurred. This can only occur if  > 1 from











Figure 4.5: Multivariate Model - Impulse response (1971q1-2006q4)
(4.24).168 However, monetary authority face a trade off between increased employ-
ment and increased price volatility and with the magnitude of unanticipated output
change being more erratic. Moreover, Table 4.4 states that overshooting of output in
response to a technology shock occurs when  > 1 8 ' 2 (0;1).
The results for the period 1994q2   2006q4 (Figure 4.7) are similar to the im-
pulse response observed for the entire sample (Figure 4.5). There are some differ-
ences vis-à-vis the impulse response for the entire sample. Firstly, Figure 4.7 illus-
trates that for the post-1994q2 sub-sample the long-run effect of a positive one stan-
dard deviation shock in technology is a less than one percent increase in both labour
168 Note this also explains the positive conditional correlation between employment and labour pro-











Figure 4.6: Multivariate Model - Impulse response (1971q1-1994q1)
productivity and output. This implies that in the post-1994q2 sub-sample, technol-
ogy shocks have less of an impact on output and employment when compared to the
entire sample period. Secondly, although, as predicted by the model, a technology
shock results in an initial decrease in the ination rate, the ination rate reached in
the post-1994q2 is higher. This is because nominal interest rates appear react more
slowly to rising prices when demand picks up. However, the growth in real money
balances are less pronounced for the sample 1994q2  2006q4.
The impulse response analysis conrms the predictions of the model for a given
set of parameter values. The crucial parameters that determine the behaviour of the











Figure 4.7: Multivariate Model - Impulse response (1994q2-2006q4)
 degree of monetary accommodation (); and
 returns to labour (').169
The South African economy's competitive structure has transformed per- to
post 1994. Aghion and Fedderke (2006) allude to the possibility of increased com-
petition in the post-1994 period, has resulted in a decrease in mark-ups in South
African industry. This is supported by Aaron and Muellbauer (2007) in which they
refer to the increased openness of the South African economy, fostering greater com-
petition and therefore lower mark-ups post 1994. This has implications for the model
169 Note that the returns to labour (') are a function of: the productivity of effort (); the elasticity of
effort's marginal disutility relative to that of employment (i.e., u vis-à-vis n); and the elasticity of











parameters.Specically, the markup rms place on price of the product is affected..A
change in a rm's markup affects the wage rate and therefore employment and labour
productivity via Equation (4.19) and (4.20).
In an environment of sticky prices, given the above, the behaviour of the econ-
omy when technology shocks occur is indeterminate unless we are aware of the val-
ues of the above parameters. The dynamics of the business cycle faced by a transition
economy will therefore vary widely from country to country.
4.6 Conclusion
We nd a negative correlation between employment and labour productivity for the
post-1994q1 data for South Africa. This nding is at odds with real business cy-
cle theory. Given this evidence, we analyze the impact of technology and non-
technology shocks on employment and labour productivity for South Africa
Given the evidence of imperfect competition reected by high markups for the
South African manufacturing sector, we adopt a model with imperfect competition,
sticky prices, and variable effort . In this model, the combination of price rigidities
and demand constraints leads rms to contract employment in the face of an ex-
ogenous increase in total factor productivity, wherein the presence of variable effort
explains why measured labour productivity may rise with employment in response
to an demand expansion. Thus the verdict is clear: the uctuations in employment











sponse of labour productivity and employment is affected by the degree of monetary
accommodation and returns to labour.
The implication of this nding is that since transition economies may have
a higher degree of monopolistic competition which entails sticky prices and high
markups, the behaviour of employment and labour productivity to shocks may differ
from developed countries. Moreover, with varying returns to labour and varying
degree of monetary accommodation, the behaviour of these economies may be unlike
that of developed economies. In particular, standard business cycle theory will be
unable to explain macroeconomic uctuations in prices, output and real interest rates
under these conditions.
A possible extension of this study is to account for regime switching by em-
ploying Markov-Switching models. This will enable one to analyse when the mone-
tary policy regime switches and its implication for the behaviour of output and em-












Exchange rate volatility and
Macroeconomic Fundamentals
5.1 Introduction
While cyclical behaviour of GDP growth does not veer the economy off its long
run growth path, exchange rate volatility may have adverse consequences on the
long-term growth prospects of an economy. Exchange rate volatility is an indica-
tion of the degree of uncertainty prevalent within an economy. Greater volatility
of a country's currency implies that agents are unable to adequately plan ahead.170
Moreover, increased uncertainty increases the threshold at which investment will oc-
cur.171 Two examples of this are: Firstly, insufcient savings in transition economies
lead to borrowing from international markets for investment and consumption. Ex-
cessive movements in their exchange rate may not only affect the ability of these
economies to repay their debt, but may also affect their ability to plan adequately
consequently creating an unfavourable investment climate. Secondly, uncertainty
created by exchange rate volatility also generates volatile terms of trade and conse-
170 See for example statement by the New Zealand Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard of March
11, 2004 and a press statement by the Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel of December, 21, 2001.











quently increased uncertainty for exporters and importers. This reduces investment
and consequently depresses international trade.172
We begin by providing some observations on the behaviour of exchange rate
volatility in transition economies in the recent past. Although previous studies ana-
lyze the behaviour of exchange rate volatility in developing, transition and developed
economies using varying econometric techniques, to our knowledge, the literature
does not specically test whether the underlying structure of the performance of ex-
change rate volatility in transition economies is consistent across theses economies
when faced with similar changes to their macroeconomic fundamentals. The Chap-
ter concludes by providing some scenarios on possible exchange rate volatility in
these economies in response to changes to a set of macroeconomic fundamentals and
external shocks.
We conduct an empirical investigation as to the determinants of exchange rate
volatility in transition economies by identifying not only possible shocks but also
macroeconomic fundamentals that may account for the persistence of exchange rate
volatility in these economies.173 In the abscence of a generally accepted model of
exchange rates,174 we draw on the empirical literature on exchange rate volatility
literature to select possible explanatory variables.175
172 See Sauer and Bohara (2001), Dell'Ariccia (1999) and Chowdhury (1993).
173 See Devereux (1997) discussing the lack of a clear theoretical framework in the literature to analyse
exchange rate volatility.
174 See Sarno and Taylor (2002).











The possibility of endogeneity present in these empirical models on currency
volatility is discussed by Devereux (1997) and Devereux and Lane (2003).176 The
issue of endogeneity in exchange rate models is common in the literature due to
technical limitations in the econometric estimation techniques that fail to account
for endogeneity issues for such models. Therefore, the study emphasizes that the
coefcients obtained using this econometric technique portrays the strength of the
relationship between the various explanatory variables and currency volatility. Thus
the the estimated coefcients should be interpreted as correlations.
We consider a panel of transition economies to determine the macroeconomic
fundamentals and external variables that drive real exchange rate volatility in these
economies. Some of the macroeconomic fundamentals investigated are:import cover,
budget balance to GDP and debt to GDP ratios, GDP growth rate, openness of the
economy, uncertainty, the current account balance, nancial deepening and the in-
ation rate. In addition, we consider oil price volatility, dollar-euro volatility and
capital ows.
The novelty of this analysis emanates from the explicitly testing of the exis-
tence of long run homogeneity of the coefcients across the countries. That is, if the
set of transition economies are sufciently similar with respect to the long run co-
efcients attached to the explanatory variables used to determine real exchange rate
volatility, conrming that these countries may be used together in a panel. The inclu-
176 Devereux (1997) states the lack of suitable instruments for the macroeconomic variables.such as











sion of explanatory variables depends on if they meet this condition. The statistical
test we use is the Hausman test statistic. This statistic is obtained from estimating
real exchange rate volatility using Pool Mean Group Estimator. Another advantage
of this approach is that the dynamics are explicitly modelled.
This Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 provides some data on exchange
rate behaviour in transition economies; Section 5.3 discusses some of the variables
that may affect currency volatility; Section 5.4 discusses the econometric method-
ology employed; Section 5.5 discusses the econometric specication of the model;
Section 5.6 provides an analysis of the data; Section 5.7 discusses the results; Section
5.8 investigates possible scenarios; and lastly Section 5.9 concludes.
5.2 Behaviour of Exchange Rate Volatility in Transition
Economies
The tequilla crisis177 of 1995 through to the Asian/Russian/Brazilian nancial crises
of 1997-98 adversely affected exchange rates in transition economies more than de-
veloped or developing countries. This is perhaps because these nancial crises em-
anated in transition economies. However, these crises also highlighted the sensitivity
of exchange rates in these economies to shocks.
The question that arises is: Does excessive exchange rate volatility occur in
transition economies only during periods of crises?
177 This is the nancial crisis that adversely affected transition economies following the December











From a set of 51 developing, developed and transition economies, Figure 5.1 il-
lustrates that exchange rates were, on average, most volatile178 in transition economies
from 1980 2000 and not only in the crisis years.179
The higher volatility in the exchange rate is associated with three stylized facts.
Firstly, transition economies are increasingly drawn into the integrated world econ-
omy with respect to both their trade in goods and services and in nancial assets.180
Moreover, the bulk of their international commerce and nance is in terms of monies
of major industrial countries, usually the US dollar. Thus private capital inows have
come to play a dominant role in transition economi s' nancing and adjustment. The
downside is the increased exposure of these economies to abrupt reversals in capital
ows and exposure to exchange rate risk. The instability associated with short-term
capital ows is reected in the countries' exchange rate gyrations. These uctuations
in the exchange rate are accelerated if the country has debt denominated in terms
of monies of major industrial countries181 Secondly, most of these economies have
moved towards manufactured exports from primary commodity exports. This move
has made their terms of trade more stable while making them more sensitive to ex-
change rate movements.182 Lastly, transition economies are subject to large nominal
178 We discuss in detail in Section 5.6 the calculation of real exchange rate volatility.
179 Hausmann et al (2006) nds a similar result for a set of 74 developed, developing and emerging
economies over the 1980-2000 period.
180 Ricci et al (2008) state that the share of world trade for emerging countries rose by 27 percent in
1990 to 37 percent in 2004.
181 Examples of such crises are the tequila crisis of 1995 through to the Asian/Russian/Brazillian
crises of 1997-98. The tequila crisis is the nancial crisis that followed the December 1994 devalu-
ation of the Mexican peso.











shocks because they have non-credible monetary institutions and weak scal posi-
tion.183 These nominal shocks are reected in excessive exchange rate variability.





















































Figure 5.1: Average Real Exchange Rate Volatility against US Dollar
Analyzing the worst performing currencies for the rst half of 2006,184 Figure
5.2 conrms that eight of the ten worst performing currencies for this period belong
to transition economies. In the rst half of 2006, the South African Rand recorded
the biggest depreciation (14,8 percent) against the dollar. Figure 5.2 also highlights
that, except for Chile, all of these countries experienced acute current account decits
for the rst half of 2006. One of the factors behind rand depreciation was concern
183 See, for example, Hausmann et al (2006).











Ten-worst performing currencies v/s US$
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Figure 5.2: Ten worst-performing currencies in the rst-half of 2006
about the widening current account decit (1,2 ercent of GDP in 2005 and 6,1 per
cent in the rst half of 2006).
Current account decits indicate the inability of savings, both private and pub-
lic, to meet private and public investment needs. Insufcient savings are indicative of
budget decits and/or high debt to GDP ratios. Thus the current account decits are
a symptom of macroeconomic imbalances. This nding supports the argument that
macroeconomic fundamentals do affect exchange rate behaviour.185 Moreover, these
imbalances not only affect the trend in the real exchange rate but also its volatility.186
This corroborates the nding of Hausmann et al (2006) that the substantial persis-
tent difference in long term real exchange rate volatilities between developed and
185 MacDonald (1999) claims that macroeconomic fundamentals have role to play in explaining ex-
change rate volatility. The paper argues for the use of error correction models in determining exchange
rates in the long run. Stockman (1988, 1995) also advocate the use of macroeconomic fundamentals
in determining real exchange rate variability.
186 Canales-Kriljenko and Harbermeier (2004) state that variables that determine the level of the ex-











transition economies indicate that there exist differences in the underlying economic
fundamentals between these two sets of countries.
5.3 Variables that affect Currency Volatility
We earlier alluded to the possibility that current account imbalances adversely affect
exchange rate volatility. Moreover, given that exchange rate volatility has adverse
consequences on economies, understanding the drivers of exchange rate volatility is
therefore crucial for economies.
Therefore considering empirical models of exchange rate volatility, Hausmann
et al (2006) test for the impact and signicance of shocks on exchange rate volatility
for a group of developed, developing and transition economies. The shocks they
consider are terms of trade shocks, output shocks and nominal shocks. They nd
terms of trade shocks are positively and signicantly correlated with variability in
the real exchange rate such that a positive terms of trade shocks should lead to an
appreciation of the real exchange. However, Hausmann et al (2006) does discover
that terms of trade shocks do have a smaller effect on exchange rate volatility during
periods of high GDP growth. An output shock, as measured by the GDP growth, is
found to have a positive and statistically signicant effect on exchange rate volatility
indicating that rising GDP growth may adversely affect exchange rate volatility. This
result is amplied for rapidly growing transition economies catching up with the











economies, exchange rate volatility is the outcome. The paper also nds nominal
shocks, as measured by a change in the ination rate, while having an insignicant
effect on exchange rate volatility,187 is able only to account for a small, statistically
signicant, difference in exchange rate volatility between developed and transition
economies.
Given the persistence of exchange rate variations and the inability of shocks
to adequately explain away the difference between volatility between developed and
transition economies,188 Engel, Mark, and West (2007) assert that real exchange rate
behavior at medium to long horizons can be at least partly explained by fundamentals.
To this end, a number of empirical studies have analyzed the link between ex-
change rate volatility and a set of variables (including macroeconomic fundamentals)
for developing, developed and transition economies using a variety of econometric
techniques. The impact of policy on exchange rate volatility through its effect on
macroeconomic fundamentals have also been studied by a number of papers. For
example, Chan and Ngiam (1998), on Singapore's experience during the Asian -
nancial crisis of 1997, state the following: The Singapore dollar has withstood the
currency storm lashing the region because of its extremely strong economic funda-
mentals...(including) low foreign debt, huge foreign exchange reserves, large current
account surpluses, substantial budget surpluses, high savings rates, strong inow of
187 Note that with the inclusion of the change in the ination rate results in a loss of a signicant
number of observations. Therefore, Hausmann et al (2006) states that this result may not be robust.











foreign direct investment, a sound nancial system and prudent government poli-
cies. This highlights the importance of sound macroeconomic fundamentals in af-
fecting real exchange rate variability.
For much of the empirical literature on exchange rate volatility inuenced by
macroeconomic fundamentals, a frequent point of departure has been the Mundell
(1961) model for assessing the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) hypothesis. Speci-
cally, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) examine the empirical determinants of bilat-
eral exchange rate volatility for a group of industrial countries, focusing on two OCA
variables - namely, trade interdependence and the degree of commonality in eco-
nomic shocks.189 They show that the proxies for asymmetric shocks and trade link-
ages go some way toward explaining variations across countries in exchange market
pressure. They claim that asymmetric shocks increase exchange rate volatility by in-
tensifying exchange market pressure. Moreover, even if there is limited intervention
by policy makers in response to asymmetric shocks, the real exchange rate remains a
major conduit for the capturing this asymmetry since it reects the price distortions
emanating from the asymmetric shock.
Bangaké (2008) closely follow the Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) speci-
cation for a set of 21 African countries for the period 1990-2003. His results support
the ndings of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) that greater bilateral trade reduces
exchange rate volatility.











A robust theoretical prediction emphasized by Hau (2002a, 2002b) and Ob-
stfeld and Rogoff (2000) is that more open economies exhibit less volatile real ex-
change rates. The argument is as follows. As an economy opens, the increase in the
volume of imported goods provides a channel for a quick adjustment of the domestic
aggregate price level. This decreases any short-run effect of monetary or real shocks
on real household money balances and therefore reduces the scope of such a shock to
develop real effects on either domestic consumption or the real exchange rate. There-
fore, relatively closed economies,due to a lower import share, are deprived of aggre-
gate price level exibility transmitted through the xchange rate. These economies,
in response to shocks, produce more pronounced effects on consumption and the real
exchange rate, ceteris paribus.190 Trade restrictions inuence the level of the real
exchange rate through its affect on domestic prices. Rising trade restrictions may
lead to rising domestic prices and an appreciation of the currency. Devereux and
Lane (2003) also nd this result for developing and developed economies.191 Hau
(2002b) cautions us to the existence of reverse causality from real exchange volatil-
ity to openness such that exchange rate risk is an impediment to trade. Thus highly
volatile exchange rates may result in countries opting for restrictive trade practices.
The movements in capital ows is reected in exchange rate movements. More
variable are capital ows to and from a country, greater the likelihood of increased
190 Incomplete exchange rate pass-through in the short run does not change the nature of the argument,
but may just imply that the structural link between real exchange rate volatility and openness is more
difcult to detect over short measurement periods.












volatility in the real and nominal exchange rate. Capital ows are inuenced by
the country-specic internal socioeconomic position and the external environment in
which the country operates.192
However, capital ows are also a function of information. That is, capital mi-
grates according to beliefs held and information available on a particular country's
internal socioeconomic position and the dictates of the external environment. Calvo,
Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) state that rising volatility of capital ows is asso-
ciated with asymmetric information. They depict a scenario where, in an environ-
ment characterized by asymmetric information, a sudden capital outow may indi-
cate to nancial markets and lenders alike that the country has suffered a negative
shock, even when no shock has occurred. This sudden capital ight may become
self-perpetuating. This outow of capital may have negative consequences for re-
serves, signalling possible existence of macroeconomic imbalances in the economy.
Consequently, the expectations that gave rise to these detrimental capital outows
may become rational. All of these changes have adverse consequences for both the
level and the variability of the real exchange rate. Policy makers can only counteract
these irrational negative capital shocks by reducing the prevalence of asymmetric in-
formation. Policy makers can also increase the condence in a country's economic
position by eliminating restrictions on capital ows. Glick and Hutchinson (2005)
192 Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) argue that the renewal of capital ows to Latin America
results from external factors and can be considered an external shock common to the region. The
theory that economic reforms in some countries give rise to expectations of future reforms in others is











argue that reducing capital ow restrictions may reduce the likelihood of currencies
being prone to speculative attacks and currency crises by reducing foreign exchange
market distortions.
Cady and Gonzalez-Garcia (2007) hypothesize that increasing transparency
and providing markets with more complete information permits market participants
to better assess a country's macroeconomic prospects. Providing up to date, com-
plete information on a country's scal position reduces the level of uncertainty with
regards to a country's prospects. Rising uncertainty increases the riskiness associated
with a particular country. This is reected in, among other things, a volatile exchange
rate.
Macroeconomic fundamentals acts as a signalling device to markets on the eco-
nomic position of an economy.193 An example of a signalling device is a country's
reserve level. A low stock of reserves may reect a history of populist monetary pol-
icy. While a high level of reserves reduces the likelihood of a currency crisis and
lowers the external borrowing cost either through improved condence in an econ-
omy and/or indirectly through improved credit ratings on foreign currency debt. That
is, a country's default risk on debt is perceived to diminish with higher reserves.194 All
this translates to into improved market sentiment with rising reserve ratios reducing
193 Cady and Gonzalez-Garcia (2007) contend a country's foreign currency liquidity position acts as
a signalling device for agents.











the uncertainty surrounding the country's fundamentals and its ability to withstand
adverse shocks.
Hviding, Nowak and Ricci (2004) show that after controlling for macroeco-
nomic conditions, increasing the level of reserves (relative to short-term debt) re-
duces the volatility of the real effective exchange rate. They argue that although
theoretically freely-oating exchange rates do not require large reserve holdings, in
practice the level of reserves may be an important signal for outside investors. Hvid-
ing et al (2004) also nd non-linear relationship between real exchange rate volatility
and reserves due to `decreasing returns to reserves'.
A second signalling device is the government scal stance as measure by either
the debt to GDP or budget balance to GDP ratios. The nding of Cady and Gonzalez-
Garcia (2007) reveals that rising debt to GDP ratios may have adverse consequences
on exchange rate volatility. Rising debt ratios signal to the market a decline in credi-
bility and sustainability of the macroeconomic policy. They signal the inability of the
government to meet its requirements through its revenue generating processes due to
inept policies. Changes in the budget balance have two countervailing effects on the
level of the real exchange rate.195 On the one hand, an improvement in the budget bal-
ance will lead to an increase in private savings such that total spending falls and price
of nontradables would fall, resulting in a depreciation of the real exchange rate.196
195 See for instance Ostry (1994), and De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994).
196 Note that overall savings would rise and total domestic demand fall in response to an improvement
in the scal balance if Ricardian Equivalence does not hold perhaps due to uncertainty surrounding











On the other hand, the current account surplus generated by the initial real deprecia-
tion197 would have to be wiped out in the long run by a real appreciation to ensure a
trade decit to offset the net inow of foreign capital.
Devereux and Lane (2003) include determinants measuring nancial linkages
between countries for a group of developing and developed economies.198 The two
sets of nancial series they consider measure the degree of internal and external -
nance. The former captures the degree of nancial depth within a country while the
latter represents bilateral portfolio debt liabilities between countries. Devereux and
Lane (2003) observe that both increased nancial deepening and external nancial
linkages reduce nominal exchange rate volatility in developing countries. An increase
in a country's nancial depth provides more efcient nancial markets by improv-
ing an economies ability to absorb shocks by facilitating intertemporal smoothing
by households and rms or adding liquidity to nancial markets (including the for-
eign exchange market).199 This helps stabilize the exchange rate. The argument for
a decline in exchange rate volatility with rising external nancial linkages has to do
with policy - developing countries will attempt to reduce exchange rate uctuations,
the greater the reliance on external nance.
197 The real depreciation of the currency originates from a decline in the domestic price level due to a
fall in demand.
198 Fernandez-Arias et al (2001) and Poirson (2001) also consider nancial factors (specically, the
ability to issue international debt in domestic currency)in a model of multivariate exchange rate volatil-
ity for a set of countries.











Attempts at controlling the uctuations in the nominal exchange rate has con-
sequences for domestic prices. Therefore, increasing reliance on external nance and
attempts by countries to control changes to the nominal exchange rate due to this re-
liance affects domestic prices and consequently, leads to increased variation of the
real exchange rate. However, since Devereux and Lane (2003) only consider nominal
exchange rate volatility, they fail to factor in price movements.
5.4 Econometric Methodology
5.4.1 Dynamic Heterogenous Panel Model
The natural advantage of using a panel data set and panel estimation is that the num-
ber of data points available becomes sufciently large to draw meaningful results.
Mark et al (2001) nd evidence that with the increased efciency from panel esti-
mation, with the focus on longer horizons, implies that the macroeconomic models
consistently provide forecasts of exchange rates that are superior to the no change
forecast from the random walk model. Further, using dynamic heterogenous panel
models, we allow for heterogeneity to exist in the short-run dynamics and test for
homogeneity in the long-run, across the set of countries. This builds on the previ-
ous literature on exchange rate volatility amongst transition economies by testing the
long-run homogeneity of currency volatility in response to macroeconomic funda-











current econometric literature, there does not exist a dynamic panel estimator that
allows for multiple cointegrating vectors.200
Following Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), we base our panel analysis on the
unrestricted error correction Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) (p,q) represen-
tation:






0ij4xi;t j + i + "it (5.1)
i = 1; 2; ::N , stand for the cross-section units (the countries that compose the middle-
income countries) and t = 1; 2; :::T denote time periods. Here yt is a scalar depen-
dent variable, xit (k  1) is the vector of (weakly exogenous) regressors for group i,
i represents the xed effects, i is a scalar coefcient on the lagged dependent vari-
able, i's is the k  1 vector of coefcients on explanatory variables, ij's are scalar
coefcients on lagged rst-differences of dependent variables, and ij's are k 1 co-
efcient vectors on rst-difference of explanatory variables, and their lagged values.
We assume that the disturbances "it's are independently distributed across i and t,
with zero means and variances 2i > 0.
We also make the assumption that i < 0 for all i. This implies that there exists
a long run relationship between yit and xit:
yit = 
0
ixit + it, i = 1; 2; :::; N; t = 1; 2; :::; T (5.2)











where i =  0i=i is the k  1 vector of the long-run coefcient, and it's are
stationary with possible non-zero means (including xed effects). Then (5.1) can be
written as






0ij4xi;t j + i + "it (5.3)
where i;t 1 is the error correction term given by (5.2) and thus i is the error coef-
cient measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.
Using the general framework described above,we consider the following ap-
proach:
Pool Mean Group Estimator (PMGE) The PMGE, advanced by Pesaran, Shin
and Smith (1999), allows the intercepts, the short-run coefcients and error vari-
ances to differ freely across groups but the long-run coefcients are constrained
to be the same. That is,
i = , i = 1; 2; :::N (5.4)
The common long-run coefcients and the group specic short-run coefcients
and the group-specic short-run coefcients are computed by the pooled maximum























































This depicts the pooling implied by the homogeneity restriction on the long-run
coefcients and the averaging across groups used to obtain means of the estimated
error-correction coefcients and other short-run parameters. Under long-run slope
homogeneity, the PMGE are consistent and efcient. The Hausman (1978) test will
be applied to examine the extent of the panel heterogeneity.
5.4.2 Threshold Autoregressive Estimation
Using the above estimation technique we can also test the Hviding, Nowak and Ricci
(2004) nding of nonlinearity of reserves by employing the Threshold Autoregres-
sive (TAR) estimation technique.201 We now include an indicator term, which we
use when testing for the existence of a non-linearity. This technique suggests the
estimation of:
yt = 0 + (11 + 12I(Pt 1  
_
P ))Pt (5.6)
where yt is a measure of currency volatility, Pt is the policy variable (reserve hold-
ings) and I(Pt 1  
_
P ) is an indicator variable.
201 See Potter (1995) and Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). Since PMGE is essentially a vector error












The indicator variable is created by selecting a potential optimal level of the




P is then subtracted from the original data series
denoted Pt 1. All values of the new series that are greater than zero are set equal
to one and all values less than zero are set equal to zero such that I(Pt 1  
_
P ) is
a dummy variable with values of zero and one. In order to determine what the
threshold level might be, we add the 11 and 12 coefcients.
Previous empirical and theoretical literature nd reserves to have a negative
effect on exchange rate volatility. This implies that 11 < 0. Thus the threshold
level of reserves
 _
P = P 

after which any further increases in reserves will either
have no effect on exchange rate volatility (11 + 12 = 0) or lead to an increase
(11 + 12 > 0) in exchange rate volatility. We test if either of these cases occur.
5.5 Specication
Standard models of exchange rates, based onmacroeconomic variables such as prices,
interest rates and output, are thought by many researchers to have failed empirically.
However, Mark et al (2001) provide evidence that exchange rates incorporate news
about future macroeconomic fundamentals. These models examine the response of
exchange rates to announcements of economic data. We assess the impact of a set











sition economies. However, in the empirical literature, there is no consensus in the
literature on a generally accepted model of exchange rates.202
Therefore, we begin by extending the econometric framework of Canales-Kriljenko
and Habermeier (2004) and Hviding, Nowak and Ricci (2004). Furthermore, since
we are explicitly concerned with effect of changes to macroeconomic fundamentals
on exchange rate volatility in transition economies, we shall test if the explanatory
variables we include in this model display a homogenous long-run effect on exchange
rate volatility for a set of transition economies. We also control for external factors
that may account for exchange rate volatility in transition economies. We demon-
strate that such models might well be able to ccount for observed real exchange rate
volatility in transition economies.
The data set consists of an unbalanced panel of 12 macroeconomic indica-
tors for 19 countries between 1981 and 2003.203 The measure of real exchange rate
volatility (REXVOL), measured as the log of the coefcient of variation for the real
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar. Given the international empirical literature dis-
cussed in Section 5.2, real exchange rate volatility is hypothesized to be related to
the following variables: the scal stance, measured as the budget surplus to GDP ra-
tio (DGBAL) or indebtedness (DBGDP), measured by the log of government debt
to GDP ratio in US dollars PPP; reserve adequacy (RA), measured as the number
202 See, for example, Sarno and Taylor (2002).
203 The set of countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
South Africa , Sri Lanka, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Paraguay, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay
and Venezuela. This set of transition economies is chosen from the International Finance Corporation











of weeks of import cover; real GDP growth (DGDP), measured in US dollars PPP
terms; the ination rate (INF) and the change in the ination rate (DINF), measured
using the consumer price index (CPI); nancial deepening, measured by the ratio of
M3 to GDP (FINDEEP); net capital inows to GDP ratio (CAPFLOW), measured in
US dollars PPP terms; the current account balance to GDP ratio (CAB); a measure of
the degree of openness of the economy (OPEN), measured as the log of the ratio of
exports plus imports to GDP; and a measure uncertainty (INSTAB), measured by the
log of the interest rate differential between the US and each country's interest rate as
a proxy for uncertainty. The interest rate differential between South Africa and US
to proxy uncertainty is highly correlated with the measure of political instability in
South Africa constructed by Fedderke et al. (2001). Furthermore, the interest rate
differential measuring uncertainty generates peaks and troughs that match historical
developments in South Africa.204
Due to data constraints, it was not possible to construct a direct measure of
the terms of trade volatility as this data is not available for all countries at a high fre-
quency. Second best is to proxy this volatility. This analysis selects oil price volatility
(OILV), measured by the volatility of the US dollar price for oil, as the measure best
suited to proxy terms of trade volatility. This is because the oil price is an important
part of either the import or export basket for almost all the countries in the sample.
It is also argued that commodity price volatility is a good proxy for terms of trade











volatility.205 Researchers also nd that commodity prices are strongly cointegrated
with the real exchange rate and may even be a better predictor of exchange rate uc-
tuations than terms of trade.206 MacDonald and Ricci (2003) provide an explanation
why this is the case. They assert that the relative accuracy of commodity price data
as opposed to arbitrary, country-specic export and import deators, together with
the high frequency of commodity price data, allows for nancial markets to anchor
their decisions on exchange rate movements to the prices of these commodities.
Given the substantial literature on the link between commodity-exporting coun-
tries and the level of the exchange rate, so it would follow that volatility in commodity
prices may also lter through to volatility in exchange rates. For example, for a com-
modity exporting country, a higher commodity price should appreciate the real ex-
change rate through income or wealth effects by inducing higher wages. This would
induce higher domestic demand and increase the price of nontradables.207 These ef-
fects should be captured in the country's terms of trade.208 Figure 5.3 portrays com-
modity price volatility matches volatile periods in the world economy as well.
There is a strong argument that there are time-specic factors at play when
considering exchange rate volatility. One example is the Asian crisis of 1997/8. Al-
though the effects of the sudden devaluation of the Thai bhat during the 1997/8 Asian
205 See Havemann (2005) for a detailed explanation of the linkage between commodity prices, terms
of trade and the real exchange rate.
206 See, for example, Chen and Rogoff (2003), MacDonald and Ricci (2002), and Cashin, Cespedes
and Sahay (2004).
207 See Cashin, Cespedes and Sahay (2004) and Diaz-Alejandro (1982).











































































Figure 5.3: Oil and gold price volatility (1970-2002)
crisis were initially only felt in south-east Asia, nancial contagion quickly spread
throughout global nancial markets. This is a good example of a case where the
poor fundamentals of one country (in this case Thailand) led to exchange rate volatil-
ity in other (emerging) countries. There are a number of approaches that may be
used to capture systemic volatility in the world economy. We use the volatility of the
Dollar-Euro exchange rate (DEUROV) as proxy for world volatility.


































where i and t are country and time indices, respectively. Xmi;t; XTOTi;t and XWi;t rep-
resent macroeconomic fundamentals, terms of trade volatility and world volatility,
respectively. i is the error correction coefcient.
The key coefcients of interest are the error correction term (), the long-run
coefcients and the Hausmann test statistic.
5.6 Data
There are a number of measures of exchange rate volatility. We use the coefcient of
variation (cvt) of the currency to capture exchange rate volatility.209 It is calculated
based on the monthly real exchange rate for each country in the sample. The coef-
cient of variation is a normalized measure of dispersion. This is a more appropriate
measure of volatility since the average real exchange rate for each country per year
is signicantly different from one another.210 It is dened as the standard deviation





Note that the formula measuring the coefcient of variation (5.8) takes account
of movements in the trend by dividing the standard deviation by the mean corre-
sponding to each year.
209 The data on exchange rate volatility including the other variables included in this study is obtained
from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.
210 I acknowledge that a measure of currency volatility using the effective real exchange rate contains
more information such as trade ows. However, the data to construct the effective real exchange rate











Most countries do not publish monthly real exchange series, so this for this
analysis we create a real exchange rate series in the standard way, by deating the
nominal exchange rate relative to the United States using that country's consumer
price index relative to the US consumer price index.
We focus on real exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the US dollar because certain
countries (like Argentina) followed xed nominal exchange rates for a considerable
duration of the sample period.211 We may argue that some of these countries had
less exible exchange rate regimes and therefore less volatile exchange rates. It is
important to realize that all countries experience real exchange rate volatility, regard-
less of the exchange rate regime. Clark et al (2004) nd that less exible exchange
rate regimes do not necessarily guarantee reduced real exchange rate volatility. This
is because the real exchange rate measures both internal prices and external prices
(tradables and non-tradables). Thus even when the nominal exchange rate is xed,
the real exchange rate is still volatile.212 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show that all real
exchange rates, pegged or oating, are characterized by currency volatility.
Furthermore, pegged currencies have a greater likelihood of becoming `freely
falling', as speculators may force the central bank to abandon a peg when reserves dry
up.213 Indeed, a exible exchange rate may bring about real exchange rate stability,
by reducing the likelihood of speculative attacks against the currency.214
211 For example, Argentina had xed exchange rate regime until the crisis of 1998.
212 See for instance Giovannini (1998), Engel (1993), Engel & Rogers (1997).
213 See, for example, Krugman (1996).











In addition, sticky prices result in real exchange rate volatility.215 Given that
the real exchange rate is frequently never equal to one, even in the long run, this
indicates a failure of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in the data. An explanation
for this is that changes to the macroeconomic environment generate deviations from
PPP as trend movements in relative prices lead to persistent deviations from PPP.
Moreover, the xing of the nominal exchange rate implies that prices reect shocks
in the economy. This leads to volatility in the real exchange rate.216
Increasing exchange rate volatility may be reecting rising uncertainty sur-
rounding the socioeconomic factors in a particular country. Figure 5.4 depicts SA
Rand volatility from 1981 to 2003. In SA Rand volatility rose, simultaneously with
rising risk levels. For example, increased political uncertainty in 1985 and 1994
when the Rubicon Speech and rst democratic elections occurred, respectively, the
real exchange rate was relatively more volatile.
Constructing this measure of exchange rate volatility for a set of transition
economies for the period 1982-2004, Figure 5.5 shows the South African Rand to be
the fourteenth most volatile currency with Turkey being the most volatile currency.217
Dissecting this sample into decades and ranking the currencies from the most to least
nd that prudential limits on banks' foreign exchange position may reduce volatility by reducing
speculative position taking. Such exchange controls may work to the detriment of the country if it
creates an environment of over-regulation.
215 See, once again, Giovannini (1998), Engel (1993), and Engel and Rogers (1997).
216 It may be better to use a trade-weighted measure of real eachange rate volatility. We argue that
for a signicant number of countries in the sample most trade and foreign debt is denominated in US
dollars, suggesting this not a particularly important problem.
217 We started out with an original sample of 23 transition economies. For reasons which we highlight











volatile, Table 5.1 shows that Argentina and Turkey continue to have the most volatile
currencies with the Bolivian pesos' volatility decreases and the South African Rand's
volatility rising towards the 2000s.
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Source: South African Reserve Bank
Figure 5.4: Rand-Dollar exchange rate from 1981-2003
5.7 Econometric Results and their Robustness
We now estimate Equation (5.7). We are unable to consider the full specication
illustrated by Equation (5.7) due to limited time series data.218 Therefore we estimate
Equation (5.7) by considering the three groups of variables. The rst group is the
country's macroeconomic fundamentals, i.e. variables that carry specic information











Figure 5.5: Real exchange rate volatility 1981-2004
about the country itself; the second group of variables  terms of trade volatility
captures the effect on real exchange rate volatility due to variability of a country's
terms of trade; and the third group of variables - world volatility - reects volatility
of international markets.
Table 5.2 illustrates the estimations whose variables have a signicant inu-
ence on real exchange rate volatility in the long-run.219 Moreover, we check whether
the Hausman test statistic reveals long-run homogeneity of currency volatility in re-
sponse to macroeconomic fundamentals and external shocks across the set of tran-













Table 5.1: Ranking of Real Exchange Rate Volatility against US Dollar
sition economies.220 The results that are presented are shown to be robust to dif-
ferent specications. From Table 5.3, we observe that the error correction term ()
is between 0 and  1, indicating that a cointegrating relationship exists for all nine
regressions.
220 As indicated by Hau (2002b), there is an inherent endogeneity problem. Therefore, to correct for











Using net capital ows and the measure of nancial deepening the homogeneity
test fails since the Hausmann test statistic is 1.31 (0.021) and 2.45 (0.015).221 We
therefore reject the null of homogeneity of the long-run coefcients. This implies
that real exchange rate volatility does not have a similar response to net capital ows
and nancial deepening across the set of 19 countries in the long run.
The breakdown of homogeneity across the countries for the measure of -
nancial deepening occurs because some countries have characteristics of developed-
country nancial markets while others have characteristics of developing-country -
nancial markets.222 Likewise, capital ows to these economies have a diverse effects
on real exchange rate volatility across the countries because the type of capital ows
that affect each economy are different. For example, some economies may have an
inordinate amount of short-term or `hot money' capital ows whilst other economies
have capital ows that reect long-term investment opportunities in a country.223
5.7.1 Macroeconomic variables (`fundamentals')
The results support the a priori expectation of the impact of changes to these macro-
economic fundamentals on real exchange rate volatility. Rising levels of reserves, an
221 The p-values are in parentheses.
222 South Africa has highly developed nancial markets similar to developed Anglo-Saxon economies.
See Kularatne (2002).
223 A point to note is that we started the analysis with 23 transition economies and we present the
analysis for a panel of 19 countries. The breakdown of the Hausman long-run homogeneity assump-
tion for the entire panel is the reason for estimation across a smaller sample. The countries that we
omitted are Australia, Israel, New Zealand and South Korea. We argue that the Hausman test fails be-
cause real exchange rate volatility in these countries are affected differently in the long run to the 19











improved scal balance, rising GDP growth, increased openness, lower ination and
lower levels of risk or uncertainty reduces real exchange rate volatility. Detail results
are given below.
1. Reserves
From Regressions [1]  [4] and [7] in Table 5.2 reports that increasing the level of
import cover, measured in number of weeks, reduces has a negative, signicant
impact on real exchange rate volatility. It is estimated that an increase in foreign
reserves of 1 week reduces exchange rate volatility by between 2 to 4 percent.
This result is robust across specications. Using the methodology outlined in
Section 5.4.2, the study tests for a nonlinear association between reserves and
exchange rate volatility. We nd that the optimal level of reserves is 4-and-half
months of import cover, after which increasing the level of reserves has an
insignicant impact on exchange rate volatility.224 The result we nd is similar
to Hviding, Nowak and Ricci (2004).
2. Fiscal policy
Improving the scal position decreases variability of the real exchange rate.
Regressions [1] and [5] indicates a one percentage point improvement in the
budget surplus to GDP ratio leads to a 0.8 percent or 1.3 percent decrease in
real exchange rate volatility, respectively. Similarly a lower debt to GDP ratio is
224 For example, at the end of 2005, South Africa had approximately 3 months of import cover.












associated with lower real exchange rate volatility. As indicated in Regressions
[2] and [9], a one percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio leads to
a 0.27 or 0.40 percent decrease in exchange rate volatility, respectively. These
results conrm the nding of Cady and Gonzalez-Garcia (2007).
3. Current account balance
The research conducted found that the level of the current account balance
did have a statistically signicant effect on rand volatility.225 A 1 percentage
point improvement in the current account will lead to 4 percent decrease in
rand volatility. In addition, improvements in the current account reduces rand
volatility at an increasing rate, i.e., the more the current account improves, there
are rising gains in terms of reduced rand volatility.
The level of reserves, a country's scal position and her current account balance
are macroeconomic fundamentals that signal to the markets the credibility and
sustainability of the macroeconomic policy. Imbalances in the economy will
lter into low levels of reserves, a deteriorating scus and/or pressure on the
current account. A deteriorating current account balance increases currency
volatility as the country's dependence on capital inows (which are relatively
mobile) increases. Fluid capital ows will adversely affect real exchange rate
volatility.226
225 See Regression [7].
226 The deteriorating current account balance in some of the emerging-market economies has been
mitigated by net equity portfolio inows. For example, in South Africa's case, net non-resident equity












GDP growth is only weakly signicant and not robust to different specications.
One regression that did include this variable is reported  Regression [4]. It
suggests that a one percentage point increase in growth leads to a 2.38 percent
decrease in real exchange rate volatility. This nding is contrary to Hausmann
et al (2006) nding of changes in output (measured by growth in GDP) having
adverse consequences for growth. The implication is that rising growth rates in
transition economies reduce currency volatility. Markets that observe growing
economies are likely to have less uncertainty regarding the macroeconomic
position of these economies resulting in reductions real exchange rate volatility.
Moreover, a strongly growing economy may be at less risk of a currency crisis
as it able to attract sufcient capital inows.
5. Uncertainty
From Regressions [1]  [7] we observe that rising levels of uncertainty increases
real exchange rate volatility between 0.10-0.12 percent for a one percent increase
in uncertainty. This nding is not surprising as we discussed in Section 5.1 that
real exchange rate volatility could be a proxy for uncertainty surrounding the
socioeconomic position of a country.
current account decit of US$ 0.8 billion. However, the dependence of South Africa on non-resident
portfolio inows has raised a potential dilemma: if equity inows suddenly stop or are reversed, the
loss of this rand stability anchor could put downward pressure on the rand and upward pressure on












From Regressions [8] and [9], rising ination rates are found to increase real
exchange rate volatility at a decreasing rate. Hausmann et al (2006) emphasize
that large nominal shocks, like an increase in the ination rate adversely affects
currency volatility in transition economies more than developed economies
because transition economies are more likely to have non-credible monetary
institutions and weak scal position.
7. Openness
A one percent increase in openness results in a 0.12 to 0.22 percent decrease
in real exchange rate volatility from Regressions [6] and [5], respectively. This
result helps to conrm the theoretical prior that relatively closed economies
with little aggregate price exibility due to a lower import share are deprived of
this aggregate price level exibility transmitted through the exchange rate and
therefore produce (ceteris paribus) more pronounced effects on consumption
and the real exchange rate. Thus, as purported by Hau (2002b), opening the
economy reduces currency volatility.
5.7.2 Terms of trade shocks
As mentioned above, terms of trade volatility is proxied in this study by oil price











volatility. All four regressions indicate rising oil price volatility has adverse con-
sequences for real exchange rate volatility. In particular, one percent increase in
oil price volatility leads to a 0.06 to 0.07 percent increase in the volatility of the ex-
change rate depending on the specication. This nding is in keeping with Hausmann
(2005).
5.7.3 World volatility
Our proxy for world volatility, the real exchange rate volatility of the Dollar-Euro in-
creases real exchange rate volatility in transition economies. A one percent increase
in Dollar-Euro volatility leads to a 2.31 percent increase in a country's real exchange
rate volatility. The argument that systemic impact of global volatility affects individ-
ual currency volatility in transition economies is supported by this result.
5.8 Scenarios
The effects of the various explanatory variables on real exchange rate volatility in
terms of actual currency is discussed below. Table 5.3 provides scenarios227 based
on the regression coefcients illustrated in Table 5.2. The scenario is simulated on
South African data.228
227 Table 5.3 depicts standardised results.
228 As we failed to reject long-run homogeneity of the regressors across the set of countries, we claim
that the impact is not statistically different across the set of transition economies in the long run.
However, for each country, the exact impact of each explanatory variable on exchange rate volatility












From Table 5.3 we observe that changes to the debt to GDP ratio and the current
account balance has the highest impact on exchange rate volatility. Worsening current
account decits and debt to GDP ratios increase the standard deviation of the real
exchange rate by 30 cents. In fact, the impact on real exchange rate volatility due to
a deterioration of the scal and the current account balance is larger than the impact
of oil price or Dollar-Euro volatility.
The results imply that government policy may have a larger impact on real ex-
change rate volatility than factors outside the domestic economy. These results once
again reinforce the importance of macroeconomic performance of the country in re-
ducing exchange rate volatility. The signalling effect of government macroeconomic
policy is crucial for real exchange rate variability. Note that this study does not study
the welfare implications of currency volatility. Therefore, one cannot claim that pru-
dent macroeconomic policy, though it may reduce currency volatility, will positively
affect welfare.229
Although the magnitude of the sensitivity of real exchange rate volatility to
world volatility and oil price volatility is relatively low, the frequency of the change
in these variables result in the daily movements in the exchange rate being affected
primarily by these two variables. This is because information on the macroeconomic












performance of the country is rather infrequent230 while information on the Dollar-
Euro exchange rate and the oil price is available instantaneously.
5.9 Conclusion
This Chapter concentrates on the cross-country determinants of exchange rate volatil-
ity for a panel of transition economies. The results indicate that the behaviour of real
exchange rate volatility to macroeconomic fundamentals and external factors, across
a set of transition economies, is similar to one another in the long run. The study
suggests that prudent macroeconomic policy - a combination of low ination and a
healthy budget balance - lowers exchange rate volatility.231 Particularly, results in
other studies underscore the role of reserves in reducing volatility, even if this is
merely as a signal to market participants. The ndings of an optimal level of import
cover is signicant in that provides a mechanism for anchoring the accumulation of
reserves at some level.
Terms of trade volatility, proxied by oil price volatility, increases exchange
rate volatility for the countries in the sample. This is not surprising as many of
the countries are either signicant importers or exporters of oil. Furthermore, the
scenarios displayed in this analysis provides a more concrete understanding as to the
impact of these variables on exchange rate volatility in Rands and cents.
230 Usually only quarterly data is available on a country's macroeconomic performance.
231 See Hausmann (2008) report to the National Treasury of South Africa highlighting the impor-












The governments of transition economies (if not all economies) should attempt
to ensure good governance, efcient institutions and strive to create an enabling envi-
ronment in order to inuence the risk-adjusted return on investment in order to reduce
the volatility of capital ows and in turn, reduce currency volatility.
A possible extension of this research, conditional on the availability of the data,
is to analyse volatility of the effective real exchange rate for this panel of transition
economies. A further extension is the inclusion of the welfare implications of cur-
rency volatility. By doing so, the research will be able to provide a normative discus-











 denotes signicance at the 10% level and denotes signicance at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.






















Import cover (months) 3* 2 1 month 29 cents 30 cents 1 cent
Budget surplus to GDP
ratio (%)
-0.59* -1.59 1 percentage
point
29 cents 49 cents 20 cents
Debt-to GDP ratio  (%) 35.8* 36.8 1 percentage
point
29 cents 59 cents 30 cents
Uncertainty Rise by 50 basis points 29 cents 31 cents 2 cents
Terms of trade
Oil volatility Standard deviation rises by
US$ 1**
29 cents 30 cents 1 cent
Openness (%) 56 55 1 percentage
point
29 cents 30 cents 1 cent
Current account
balance
-4.10* -5.1 1 percentage
point
29 cents 59 cents 30 cents
World volatility
Dollar/Euro volatility Standard deviation rises by
1 US cent**
29 cents 34 cents 5 cents
1. Measures deviation of Rand-US$ exchange rate from its mean in Rand cents (standardized)
2. Measures increase in standard deviation of Rand US$ exchange rate (in cents)













Final Discussion and Suggestions for
Future Research
This thesis investigates the drivers of economic growth in transition economies
with special emphasis on some of the institutional and macroeconomic challenges
faced by these economies. The study develops theoretical and empirical models ex-
amine the redistribution of resources in a society, the impact of infrastructure devel-
opment on growth, uctuations in GDP, employment and labour productivity, and
nally, the determinants of exchange rate volatility in transition economies.
The rst issue we discuss is the possible tension between groups in society
over the reallocation of resources. Chapter 2 begins with the development of a model
of conict in which two groups in society are engaged in strategic interaction. The
two groups are the privileged and the disadvantaged. Each member of the privileged
group has more of the resource than the disadvantaged group. The main assumption
of the model is that redistribution to the disadvantaged from the privileged group can
increase the productive capacity of society, but comes at the cost of rising political
aspirations of the resource poor, which erodes the power of the resource rich. Results
in this Chapter derives conditions under which the rich will redistribute to the point











as well as the range of intermediate redistributive activity and associated levels of
conict likely to be employed by the privileged.
The model presented in Chapter 2 advances on the literature by showing the
importance of the technology of production in societies in determining the possible
political outcomes for society. In particular, the model argues that genocide of the
disadvantaged group is more likely in agrarian societies as opposed to industrial so-
cieties. The model emphasizes the importance of the preference function, and the
relative population size and initial resource allocations between the two groups in
society in affecting the resource transfer between the two groups and the degree of
conict.
An extension to the model presented in Chapter 2 is to test the model on
empirical data to determine if the models parameters are a good predictor of conict.
Moreover, the investigation of the dynamic interaction of these competing groups in
society rather than only the steady-state solutions will provide a description of the
behaviour of a society from conict to peace and vice versa.
Once conict is resolved, the infrastructure development is crucial for any
economy. This is more so for rapidly growing transition economies experiencing
capacity constraints due to limited physical infrastructure. Chapter 3 empirically












The model presented in Chapter 3 shows that public infrastructure expenditure
has a positive effect on GDP directly and indirectly by increasing the marginal prod-
uct of private investment. However, the empirical results nd that both economic
and social infrastructure investment adversely affects private investment. The coun-
tervailing nding is explained by the crowding out of private investment by public
investment.
Moreover, the ndings of the Chapter suggest that while expenditure on eco-
nomic infrastructure has a marginal (indirect), positive effect on per capita output,
social infrastructure expenditure has no net output ffects in South Africa. Two pos-
sible reasons the Chapter proposes is that either social infrastructure expenditure is
ineffective or that the crowding out of private investment by increases in social in-
frastructure investment negates any positive effect of such spending on GDP. Chap-
ter 3 also nds positive effect of rising output and private investment on public in-
frastructure investment indicating that as the economy grows, individuals demand
more and better roads, schools and hospitals.
Analyzing the efciency of infrastructure by the quality of the services pro-
vided by the physical infrastructure stock is crucial in identifying the impact of in-
frastructure expenditure on growth. Thus one should explore how the quality and
not only the quantity of infrastructure affects growth. It may indeed be the case that,











ters. However, the lack of data on the quality of infrastructure makes this analysis an
arduous proposition.
Chapter 4 reveals that the short-run dynamics of labour productivity and em-
ployment in transition economies may not follow the standard real business cycle lit-
erature. In particular, the South African data displays a negative correlation between
employment and labour productivity. An explanation of this behaviour is found in
new-Keynesian business cycle models with monopolistic competition, sticky prices
and variable labour effort. The model and empirical results conrm the importance
of monetary accommodation, the degree of price stickiness in the product market, the
magnitude of the markup and returns to labour in determining the behaviour of em-
ployment and labour productivity in response to technology shocks. The implication
of this nding is that since transition economies may have a higher degree of monop-
olistic competition which entails sticky prices and high markups, the behaviour of
employment and labour productivity to shocks may differ from developed countries.
Given the interaction between returns to labour and markups highlighted by
Hall (1989), an extension to Chapter 4 is to estimate the exact returns to labour.
Moreover, the difference in response of labour productivity and employment to a
technology shock for the different sub-samples may indicate that the structure of the
South African business cycle and/or, the policy responses to technology shocks may
be changing. This indicates the possibility of regime shifts in the sample. Therefore,











changes to the monetary regime adhered to by the central bank and thus allow us to
obtain a value for the degree of monetary accommodation in each regime.
In addition, Chapter 4 does not discuss possible imperfections in the South
African labour market. Fedderke and Mariotti (2002) argue that the inexibility of
the labour market and the low skill level of the labour force are far more probable
as a cause of sluggish employment growth resulting in the inability of real wages to
appropriately adjust to labour productivity. Asymmetric information in the labour
market may also affect the dynamics of employment and labour productivity. This
too should be explored.
Chapter 5 considers the cross-country determinants of exchange rate volatility
for a set of transition economies. Overall, the Chapter nds volatility is increased
by increased uncertainty, terms of trade volatility, and loose scal policy while an
improved current account balance and increased openness of the economy reduces
currency volatility. Reserves are found to reduce real exchange rate volatility at a
decreasing rate with the optimal level of reserves being 4 1
2
months.
From a policy perspective, whilst it is clear that prudent macroeconomic policy
is the best course of action to reduce exchange rate volatility, the inuence of external
volatility on the exchange rate (over which the authorities have no control) should not
be underestimated. Since the real exchange rate represents the relative price of trad-
ables to non-tradables goods, a volatile real exchange rate may buffer the economy











This may be the possible reason for the literature on the relationship between trade
and exchange rate volatility providing mixed results.
Furthermore, exchange rate volatility is affected by unobservable variables
such as market sentiment and expectations. These variables are, however, relatively
more difcult to measure. This implies that models of exchange rate volatility that
do not account for these variables, may miss the true picture. Thus, obtaining mea-
surable proxy variables of market sentiment and expectations will provide a better
gauge of currency volatility. This however is an arduous task.
The economic issues affecting transition economies investigated in this thesis
indicate the complex nature of the macroeconomic challenges facing these economies.
This thesis has examined some of the macroeconomic issues affecting transition
economies. More research on some of these issues will provide a more complete
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An Index of Economic Infrastructure
In the literature, two basic approaches have been suggested for measuring in-
frastructure stock. The rst is to measure expenditure on infrastructure. Second, is to
use physical measures by taking inventory of the quantity of the pertinent structures
and facilities. Observing times series data on actual physical infrastructure available in
SA will provide one with a non-monetary indication of the infrastructure capital stock
in the country.
The indicator of productive infrastructures employed has been calculated aggre-















(b11 + b21 + :::+ bn1)x1 + :::
(b12 + b22 + :::+ bn2)x2 + :::+ (b1n + b2n + :::+ bnn)xn

(A.1)
where xj represents the different measures of physical infrastructure,233 bij are calcu-
lated by applying the varimax rotation on the principal eigenvectors obtained from the
data set of the measures of physical infrastructure. A varimax rotation is a change of
coordinates used in the principal component analysis that maximizes the sum of the
variance.
232 See Anderson (1984) for a full description of the methodology followed.
233 xj is observation value after elimination of scale bias, i.e., xj = (Xj  
 
X)=, where Xj is the
original observation,
 
X is the mean of the series and  its standard deviation.
